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CLEAVAGE POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS  
OF VOTING IN THE MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

by



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A THESIS

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## ABSTRACT

Recent changes in Montana's society and political structure -- the state adopted a new constitution in 1972 -- have been followed by the emergence of a new set of political issues in the state. This study examines the legislative voting behavior of the 1973 session of the Montana House of Representatives in an attempt to establish the relationship between the new "old" and "new" politics -- and a traditional set of issues. The study has been conducted in four stages: first, a review of the literature on legislative voting behavior; second, a review of the Montana House of Representatives; third, a review of the Montana House of Representatives; and fourth, a review of the Montana House of Representatives. The study found that political parties are a major force in Montana voting on issue dimensions in both the "old" and "new" politics. The study also found that the Montana House of Representatives is a highly polarized body, with a high degree of ideological diversity. The study also found that the Montana House of Representatives is a highly polarized body, with a high degree of ideological diversity. The study also found that the Montana House of Representatives is a highly polarized body, with a high degree of ideological diversity. The study also found that the Montana House of Representatives is a highly polarized body, with a high degree of ideological diversity.

TO

Dr. Richard Roeder,  
an inspirational scholar,

AND

Francis Bardanoue,  
a sage among philistines





## ABSTRACT

Recent changes in Montana's society and political structure - - the state adopted a new constitution in 1972 - - have been followed by the emergence of a new set of political issues in the state. This study examines the legislative voting behavior of the 43rd session of the Montana House of Representatives in an attempt to establish the relationship between the new issue set - - "new politics" - - and a traditional set of political issues that have been rooted in long-standing interest sectors of the state. A factor analysis of select roll call votes revealed several issue dimensions within both the traditional and "new politics" issue areas. An investigation of the voting patterns on each of the issue dimensions was conducted for the determinant effects of three main independent variables: political party, economic-geographic region and constituency characteristics. It was found that political party was a major force in shaping voting on issue dimensions in both the "new politics" and the traditional issue areas. Regional and constituency characteristics were also found, but mostly in secondary issue dimensions. There is some evidence which seems to indicate that urbanization and "new politics" issues could provide the Democrats with the base for a single party dominant system.





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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

It seems quite natural to view politics as a form of social action taken within a community to manage and resolve the tensions and conflict which emanate from those socio-economic forces that create and perpetuate differing interest sectors in that community. This perspective is found in the classical writings of the European school of political sociology, such as the works of Marx and Durkheim, of Simmel and Weber. These scholars saw the evolutionary development of the community, especially in terms of its social organization, its institutional and structural bases, and its expansion to absorb and integrate neighboring communities within its own boundaries and culture, as the primary source of political division within a given society. It was the social forces of such an evolutionary development that were seen to produce differing bases of interest for the various segments of a community. Furthermore, such interests provided the lines for cleavage whenever two or more interests clashed in their demands regarding the use of community resources. And it was this cleavage system that was seen as fundamental to the political fragmentation of a community.

The socio-economic element of a community is one of the most potent social forces leading to differing interest bases. The economies of earlier communities were virtually determined by the productivity of the land. Thus the geographic location of a community largely influenced the nature of its economy. Within such communities the interest sectors were defined in terms of geographic





differences, and hence cleavages fell primarily according to the diversity of the economic geography of a community. Actually, such a geographically based thesis far predates the European political sociological school. For example, Aristotle contemplated the effects that climactic zones had on political systems. But the European school placed the thesis within a more sophisticated framework that related socio-economic factors with interest sectors and with resultant cleavage systems. Within this framework, a community may be examined on the basis of the cleavages that cut that community into sub-communities with competing interests.

In democratic polities, one can link the cleavage thesis to another traditionally recognized problem of politics: that of the representation of the citizenry and its interests in the policy-making processes of government. Presumably, successful candidates for office are selected because they are viewed by their electorate as capable representatives of the constituency's dominant interests. Such an expectation about representation carries directly to the policy forum itself, being expressed in legislation and in support for legislation that centers on advancing the interests of the representative's constituency.

The membership of most popularly elected legislative assemblies is defined by constituencies which are geographically based. This practice can be traced back to the time when interests were readily distinguished by territorial lines. Peter Pulzer, in Political Representation and Elections, argued that during the eighteenth century it became proper and desirable to base representation by interests. He



went on to note that between 1660 and 1832 British Parliament performed splendidly in representing landed property, which was the paramount interest of that time. From this example, it is easily seen that the concern of representative government and the cleavage thesis overlap at a point where the interest sectors of a community are identified.

While, as indicated above, neither the social cleavage thesis nor the problem of representative government has strictly been a current social scientific concern, there has been a revived interest among some contemporary political analysts in both topics. Post-World War II commentators on comparative political systems have been overly pre-occupied with identifying the principles of political stability. Western democracies that have exhibited stable political regimes have been extensively scrutinized in an effort to explain these nations' abilities to maintain enduring political systems. Part of this analysis has witnessed a re-kindled interest in the social cleavage thesis. In particular, investigators have been curious as to how nations with serious social cleavages are able to integrate conflicting segments and, hence, to maintain an established political order. In this regard, political party systems have received primary attention by some writers. Important recent works by Lipset and Rokkan,<sup>1</sup> by Allardt and Littunen,<sup>2</sup> and by Eckstein<sup>3</sup> have taken that direction. Equally important, another school of the social cleavage thesis has focused on the behavior of political elites in accommodating cleavages which separate their supporting, mass-based constituencies. This school--often labeled the consociational school--is typified by the writings of Lijphart, Lorwin, Daalder, Engelmann, and K. McRae.<sup>4</sup>



On the other hand, post-World War II American political science has taken the question of "party responsibility" to constitute the most pervasive and primary problem of representative government. Much of the literature generated on this topic has centered on the attempt to demonstrate that American legislative parties are responsible. Turner's Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress and Truman's The Congressional Party both argued that congressional voting behavior reflected important differences between the two national parties, thus suggesting the bases of a responsible party system. These studies popularized the methodology of quantitative roll call analysis, and subsequently several research projects have been conducted which investigate the voting patterns exhibited in roll calls. Many of these studies have reported that roll-call voting patterns reveal the representation of special interests (defined as issue blocs) or the presence of legislative voting coalitions within the overall voting behavior of legislators. One of the most sophisticated works of this kind is Duncan MacRae's Dimensions of Congressional Voting, in which congressional voting patterns were systematically compared with regard to constituency characteristics.

By examining both the cleavage system of a community and the salient interests which its political elite represent, one is provided a useful perspective from which to examine the political evolution of a society. As socio-economic forces alter the interest sectors within a given community, a corresponding change should follow in the interests which its political elite represent, although the time that it takes for a legislator to reflect changes in his constituency interest





sectors may be of some length. Thus, for example, a community which had its interests defined for some time along lines of economic geography would undoubtedly have those interests championed by its representatives.

However, there are complicating factors yet to be included. For example, over time there may emerge socio-economic forces (e.g., a change in population size due to immigration, rapid urbanization, etc.) which may intensify other interests within this community. These may lead to alterations in its interest sectors such that a separation of the social and geographical bases of that community's cleavages might result. One would expect from this a new set of dominant interests that would either parallel or supersede the more traditional interests. Another complication arises by virtue of the mass political party, which organizes its support through an integration of diverse interests and support groups. Thus, a political party may mirror many of a community's interest sectors in order to build an electoral coalition large enough for victory. The elected representative must then contend not only with the diversity of his electoral coalition (i.e., his constituency), but also with his party leadership within the legislature. In short, the changes in this hypothetical community's interest sectors may radically alter the nature of its representative's stance on issues. In addition, if the incumbent party is capable of readily integrating newly emergent interest sectors, then a change in dominance of interest sectors does not necessarily lead to a change in the party in power.



In this thesis I have attempted to provide a specific application of the theoretical perspectives described above. It is an attempt to explain certain aspects of Montana state politics in terms of traditional and contemporary socio-economic cleavages found there and to indicate the extent to which interests arising from these cleavages manifest themselves in voting patterns in the state's House of Representatives. Montana's society has traditionally been divided by the two main components of its resources-based economy, which pitted the agricultural interests of its prairies against the mining and lumber interests of its mountain regions. But contemporary society in Montana has undergone several changes: urbanization has transformed the state's population from a rural to a largely city-based one; employment in its primary industries--agriculture and mining--has been rapidly declining; steadily increasing government spending, from both federal and state sources, has become necessary to keep the state afloat; a massive exodus of the young adults (ages 20 to 30) has cost the state the considerable part of a generation; and so it goes. One would expect these socio-economic forces to have altered the state's cleavage system. These expectations are worthy of further study, and the several chapters to follow contain the results of such an undertaking.

In the next chapter, I have traced the historical development of the social cleavage patterns traditional to Montana society and have discussed the manner in which they have led to particular forms of political division and accommodation. The third chapter contains a description of the methodology and research design I have used to





investigate the extent to which social cleavage based political divisions are reflected in the representation of particular interests through the voting behavior of members of the Montana House of Representatives. The patterns of voting on legislation pertinent to both traditional and newly emergent political issue areas which were discerned through that methodology are described in Chapter Four. There, the distribution of individual members' scores on each of several such issue areas is discussed and the inter-correlation of members' scores on differing issues is assessed. In Chapter Five, characteristics of the individual members' constituencies are used to predict the members' scores on the several issue-voting indices, thereby providing some means of determining the extent to which social cleavages characterizing particular constituency bases are reflected in the formal legislative behavior of representatives. The role of the parties as interest aggregation mechanisms mediating this process is also analyzed. Finally, an overall assessment of the main findings of the study is set out in the concluding chapter and their implications regarding contemporary and future events in Montana politics are considered.



## CHAPTER II

### MONTANA'S POLITICS: SILVER-TONGUED INTERESTS

I have a mortgage of \$1000 against my land. The Peters Investment Company in Elmore, Minnesota, holds it. I need to borrow money for next year's seed, but I cannot even pay the interest due on the mortgage, and due to the last three crop failures, I owe \$1300.<sup>1</sup>

I've been around the mines all my life and I'm tired of it. My father worked in the Anaconda copper mine up in Butte. Died at 55 working in that goddamn rathole.<sup>2</sup>

Over half a century separates the dates of the two testimonials cited above, the first statement being written sometime around 1919 and the second having been made in 1975. Yet the difference in years is immaterial, for the sentiments expressed in each capture a mood that many Montanans have felt over the years since the territory was first settled. They represent feelings of resentment and frustration, of panic and despair that have typified the lives of Montanans throughout the history of the state. It seems overly ironic to present such a gloomy portrayal of a land that is known as the "Treasure State". Yet the harshness of the lives of Montanans over the years has been drawn together in a kind of naive philosophy of life that is able to incorporate both "treasures" and "sorrows", providing acceptance of each, in its proper place.

It is true that these same Montanans, who have lived with more than an equitable share of life's hardships, would themselves, no doubt, deny a life of misery. For the most part, these people



visualize themselves in terms of the lay-romanticism of "rugged individualism," as individuals cast against their environment, each one surviving alone as best he can. Indeed, those persons who have managed to endure the struggle with Nature, who have stayed in their place rather than emigrate to more hospitable locales, take special pride in being portrayed as "rugged individualists". The miseries which may have been brought upon them by the harsh demands of life on the Montana frontier are worn as a badge of honor, as a testimony to their achievements in simply surviving there.

Accounts of Montana's history focus on the physical environment as the main shaper of Montana's development. What characterizes this omnipotent, ubiquitous force that could form the destiny of a whole society? The best single word describing the force is "extremity". Montana is a state of extreme distances, extreme differences in terrain, and wide variations in climate. Along the 49th parallel, which serves as its northern border and as the boundary that separates the United States and Canada, Montana stretches some 560 miles, from the eastern border of Idaho to the western boundary of North Dakota. From the border with Canada to its southernmost point, there is a distance of some 320 miles to be spanned. In total area, Montana covers over 147,000 square miles.<sup>3</sup>

Montana is divided by the Continental Divide. The western third is mountainous and drains to the Columbia River. East of the Rockies, the other two thirds form high plateaus and drain to the Missouri. The West has Pacific weather; the East is rather arid



and has widely fluctuating temperatures. Vastness of territory and regional differences in turn make for heterogeneous settlement and varied economic development. K. Ross Toole, a prominent Montana historian, described the significance of these differences:

In the west, the wealth was locked in bedrock, or it grew on the mountain slopes in the form of pine, larch, fir, and spruce that had to be harvested with large crews, heavy equipment, and elaborate planning. In the east, the wealth was mobile - "cattle on a thousand hills" or sheep moving like whitecaps on a sea. These differences conditioned Montanans to ask different things of their government, both local and national, and it conditioned them to react differently to statewide and interstate involvements.<sup>4</sup>

### Bases of Social Cleavage

Geographic determinism is indeed the hallmark of academic analyses of Montana's society. Such a geographically and economically deterministic explanation of Montana is without a doubt historically accurate. Representative of this type of analysis is Thomas Payne's explication:

The politics of the Treasure State is profoundly affected by factors of geography and resources. Its geographical location (and relative isolation) destined it to be a raw-materials-producing state rather than an industrial one. The existence of substantial deposits of precious metals precipitated the initial development of mining activity. Limited rainfall determined the kind of agriculture that could flourish - cattle ranching, strip farming for grain, and irrigated-valley farming in some areas. Much, if not all, of the economic development, in turn, has shaped the political context to an appreciable degree. Thus we can speak of a politics of copper, a politics of wheat, a politics of cattle, and so on.<sup>5</sup>

Montana's mineral riches were exploited by Eastern capital, leaving wages in Montana, but taking profits east. Gerald Nash





claims that exploitation of the West was restricted to the period prior to the Second World War. Yet Montana never did develop the industry necessary to create the capital to control its mineral resources. The upsurge in Western population after 1945 left that of Montana nearly stagnant. Its main cleavage remained - that between the mining West and the ranching and wheat-growing East. Its pre-dominant politics continued to be based on these uses of the land.

Like much of the West, Montana attracted many settlers with technological and entrepreneurial skills, some of whom stayed, while others moved on. Then there came a different group of settlers, a part of the back-to-the-land movement of the turn of the century. They saw, in Montana, the opportunity of reconstructing some of the early rural America. These two groups seemed to divide Montana into an individualistic entrepreneurial and into a moralistic communal subculture.

Support in identifying these two types of subcultures in Montana can be found in Daniel Elazar's list of state political cultures.<sup>6</sup> Elazar defined three subcultures according to his conception of the ideal political order, the individualistic (I), moralistic (M), and traditionalistic (T). The I subculture treats the political order as a marketplace in which various groups, individuals, and programs compete for public goods in the form of governmental services and controls. Politics is viewed as just another means of improving oneself socially and economically. The M subculture emphasizes a notion of the commonwealth and the political order is viewed as a



means of attaining the public good rather than the demands of special interests composing society. "Politics [in the M subculture] is considered one of the great activities of man in his search for the good society - a struggle for power, it is true, but also an effort to exercise power for the betterment of the commonwealth."<sup>7</sup> Finally, the T subculture is rooted to the preservation of a hierarchical social order, and politics is viewed as a privilege maintained only for the established elite. The sources of the three subcultures are given as primarily ethnic and historical.

The areal distribution of the subcultures has been the result of specific migration patterns. In particular, Elazar typed Montana's political culture as moralistic dominant with a strong individualistic strain.<sup>8</sup> To support this classification Elazar noted the strong migration stream of Scandinavian groups (which he argued as having established a moralistic political culture) across northern and central Montana (see Figure 2.1). Furthermore, he pointed out that the Rocky Mountains served to block the neat, lateral westward flow of the three cultural streams and "divert people from all three [types] into the valleys from north to south in search of fortunes in mining and specialized agricultural pursuits. There the more individualistic types from all three subcultures diffused from Montana to Arizona, creating cultural pockets in all the mountain states."<sup>9</sup> Corroborating Elazar's claims, those who settled northern Montana were primarily from Minnesota, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Maine (all classified by Elazar as moralistic dominant).<sup>10</sup>



FIGURE 2.1



Generalized Map of Migration of Cultural Streams across the United States \*

\* Daniel J. Elazar. American Federalism: A View from the States, 2nd ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), pp.110-111.






Furthermore, Abbott, a Montana historian, cited that the ethnic groups in the mining regions were the Irish and central and southern Europeans.<sup>11</sup> Elazar claimed that, "Most of these settlers [i.e., from Ireland, Italy, central and eastern Europe, and the Balkans] though bound at first by traditional cultural patterns, soon adopted more individualistic attitudes and goals that brought them into the individualistic political culture."<sup>12</sup>

Elazer's identification of two Montanan subcultures, I and M, coincide with the earlier discussion. This value differentiation, combined with disagreements between Montanans based on the cleavage between mining and agriculture, crystallizes in specific patterns which have become Montana's primary political forces (Figure 2.2). On the one side there is the conflict between labor and management; on the other side it is the cattleman, who treats his agricultural enterprise as a strict business venture, and the grain farmer, who considers the family farm as a way of life. Yet, the obvious alliance between big businesses (i.e., utilities, mining, transportation, banking, and cattle companies) versus the coalition of unionized labor and farm organizations is also tenuous in nature. Many a grain farmer from the "highline", those wheat producing counties bounded by the Canadian border to the north and the Missouri River to the south, would assure you that he could exist quite well without ever having to confront the labor-boys of Butte and Anaconda. Similarly, the seemingly impregnable association between the cattle industry and big businesses has recently been strained over the battle for range-



FIGURE 2.2  
MONTANAN CLEAVAGES AND CORRESPONDING INTEREST SECTORS





land which has coal beneath its grassed surface.

To summarize, Montana is divided geographically, by the Rocky Mountains, into an eastern and western region. Within this division also lies a natural dispersion of resources, with western Montana rich in minerals, lumber, and water, and eastern Montana wealthy in dry-land farming, rangeland, oil, and coal. It was because of the nature of this wealth that Montana was settled, and the economy which developed was based on the extraction and exportation of these resources. Societal conflict in the state is organized along the lines of the competing interests which define its economy. Montana is a land-conscious culture, and its politics is one of competing land claims and uses.

#### Politics of Mining and Agriculture

The development of political issue areas in the Montana legislature can be best understood by tracing the histories of its mining, agricultural, and energy politics. Thus, the following discussion briefly reviews those events within the three resource economies that shaped legislative tradition. Mining politics has been characterized by a battle among colorful copper barons, by corporate subjugation, and by a co-opted labor force. The fact is that probably more has been written about the "War of the Copper Kings" than any other era of the state's history, excepting only the Indian wars and Custer's last stand. The two key personalities in this power struggle were William Clark and Marcus Daly, both mining magnates and both Democrats. Their feud, which lasted twelve years (and



stopped only because of Daly's death), erupted in 1888 when Daly secretly supported the Republican candidate for territorial delegate instead of Clark, who was the Democratic candidate. Clark had been confident of victory, but some evidence indicates that it was in the financial interests of Daly and his fellow incorporators in a lumber enterprise to ensure a Republican victory.<sup>13</sup> Clark felt lasting bitterness over the betrayal. One of the major contests between the two was over the permanent location of the state capital. The Clark faction favored Helena while the Daly faction favored Anaconda, the smelter city he founded. In the election of 1894 Helena triumphed over Anaconda as the permanent seat, but the election had been marked by the open buying of votes by Daly and Clark.<sup>14</sup> The climax between the barons came in the election of 1898. Clark had been denied the territorial delegate seat once and the U.S. Senate twice, but his ambition was not deterred as he actively sought a senatorial seat. Since the state legislature then selected Montana's U.S. Senators, control of the legislature became the major strategy. In the 1898 contest within the legislature, fought with every devious tactic of politics, party lines broke down and there was a direct contest between a Clark faction and a Daly faction. The end result revealed Clark the winner, but only temporarily. When Clark arrived in Washington, D.C., in 1899 to take his seat he found that he had been preceded by a memorial, signed by the Governor and some leaders from both parties, "alleging corruption with his election and remonstrating against his being seated."<sup>15</sup> Before the





Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections reported its findings, Clark resigned his seat, and no further action was taken. But Clark still had an ace up his sleeve. In Montana his supporters had been busily arranging the governor's absence from the state on the day of Clark's Senate resignation. The lieutenant-governor, a Clark supporter, having assumed the responsibilities of the governor in his absence, then appointed Clark to fill the vacancy which Clark himself had created by resigning the day before. The Senate finally refused to seat him.

The importance of this episode is the impact it had on the legislature in its infancy. Legislative politics became a power struggle not between political parties<sup>16</sup> but rather between two personalities. Senator Thomas Walsh wrote in 1913 that he felt the "checkered history of the state was largely due to the ploys of the Copper Kings . . . [who] seemingly regarded the institutions of Montana as little more than instruments in their campaigns for personal supremacy."<sup>17</sup>

Probably the most dominant force in Montana politics has been the Anaconda Copper Company or the "Company" as it is usually referred to. The Company's tentacles not only embraced all of mining and its politics but also ventured into the cattle industry, lumber mills, railroading, coal and hydroelectric development, newspapers, and especially, the operations of the state legislature. Its origins trace back to the war among the Copper Kings. Between 1897 and 1901 a significant series of mining consolidations in the copper industry



forewarned a major change in ownership of copper enterprises.<sup>18</sup> In 1897 two companies, the Butte and Boston Co. and the Boston and Montana Co., both exclusively Boston financed properties, were consolidated. Later that same year Clark incorporated his interests under one corporate head. Then in 1899 three of the state's large smelting operations were consolidated into one smelting and refining corporation. But the climactic event occurred in 1899 with the announcement that the Standard Oil Company had purchased the Anaconda Company; it formed a holding company, the Amalgamated Copper Company.<sup>19</sup> "Under the umbrella of this vast device it reached out for other companies and allied enterprises in Montana."<sup>20</sup> In 1901 Amalgamated Copper took control of the Boston properties. In 1906 Amalgamated bought the United Copper Company of F. Augustus Heinze, one of the two remaining Copper Kings. The single Copper King left, Clark, sold his smelter, realty company, and certain mines to Amalgamated in 1910. Thus, by the end of that year Amalgamated Copper had accomplished what H. Rodgers of Standard Oil had intended from the very start: a copper trust. But in 1915, under federal government pressure, the trust was broken up. As Toole described it:

In 1915 the Amalgamated Copper Company dissolved itself and, by a complicated series of maneuvers, transferred the property of the holding company back to the operating company, the Anaconda. The transfer was not of particular consequence to Montana. The Anaconda was now as much a non-resident company as Amalgamated. Policy was still determined in New York, not Butte. Control of the press was just as rigid. Independent operators in Butte were practically nonexistent, and independent lumbering concerns in Montana were not significant either in terms of number or magnitude of operation. Anaconda's influence in political



affairs was steady and usually unspectacular, but it was very great. Montana was a one-company state.<sup>21</sup>

The Company's presence in the state legislature was felt in four ways. First, the Company used strong-arm tactics by shutting down the state's economy several times to get its own way. Beside direct coercion, the Company maintained a superior lobbying staff to cajole the legislature. Thirdly, the Company had a stranglehold on public opinion by virtue of owning all the daily newspapers in four of the five largest cities. In what seems to be a conservative estimate, Payne claimed that, "The company papers had about 55 per cent of the total daily newspaper circulation and about 60 percent of the total Sunday circulation."<sup>22</sup> Finally, the Company was able to maintain effective control of the leadership of the state's unionized labor.

Coercion was first used in 1903, when the Company found itself stopped by the courts in its effort to subdue F. Augustus Heinze. Through a state-wide shutdown that threw four-fifths of Montana's wage earners out of work, the Company forced a special session of the legislature and got its way. Three years later, the Company effectively used a shutdown to break the militant wing of its union. In 1921, finally, Anaconda closed its mines and smelters for nine months to foil the Progressive Governor Joseph Dixon, who had planned, through a special legislative session, to close the wide gap between the low taxes on mining companies and taxes paid by the rest of Montana's economy.

The Company maintained an elite squad of lobbyists at the





legislature. There were two levels of lobbyists. The first was permanent staff who spent full time, the year around, updating and compiling dossiers on the legislators and the political pulse of the state. Also, sessional lobbyists were hired for special roles. They tended to be attorneys while the permanent lobbyist usually had an official title with A.C.M. The Company lobby was able to hold a vast amount of influence in the legislature by functioning as an information agency. The state did not provide legislators or the committee system with research staff.<sup>23</sup> Thus, the Company lobby kept track of the exact status of each bill so that the inquisitive legislator could be told precisely where a bill was at that moment. A bill-writing service, gratis, was also provided. At committee hearings the lobbyist provided both sides of a debate with facts and figures. On important Company votes a key A.C.M. lobbyist would often act as an extra-parliamentarian whip, lining up his coalition. In sum, often the only counsel available to the ill-informed legislator was from the experts of the A.C.M.

Amalgamated Copper, as mentioned earlier, bought several Montana newspapers in its campaign against Heinze. Until 1930 the Company papers were involved in full scale assaults on candidates and policies that were unfavorable to the Company. Both Senator Burton Wheeler and Governor Joseph Dixon felt the wrath of the Company press during this period.<sup>24</sup> But beginning with the 1930's the Company papers changed from an aggressive, full-coverage treatment of political news to a policy of selected reporting.



A journalistic coup de théâtre occurred in 1959 when Lee Newspapers purchased all of the Company press. The new owners gave each of its Montana papers a greater level of local autonomy in editorial policy, and local news coverage was once again strengthened.

Labor relations with the Company have made for strange bedfellows. Prior to Amalgamated, Montana workingmen were in a position of political power. Union recognition in Montana succeeded at a time when workers elsewhere in the nation were failing to obtain it. "Impelled by competition for the labor supply [which was highly transient], mine owners recognized unions and granted high pay scales."<sup>25</sup> However, with the arrival of the copper trust, the union found itself not dealing with the paternalism of the Copper Kings, but rather with Standard Oil's labor policy which was inherently hostile to labor organizations, to strikes, and to bargaining. The copper trust instigated a blacklisting procedure for activists in the union (W.F.M.). Its spies infiltrated the union, and the Company hired "goon squads" - Pinkertons and squads from the Thiel and Burns agencies - to harass strike leaders and intimidate workers. These repressive actions by the Company continued until the summer of 1914 at which time Butte became a site of open warfare. The killing, fighting, and dynamiting finally ended with Butte being placed under martial law. Shortly thereafter, the Company announced an open shop and said that it would not deal with or recognize any union. From 1914 to 1917, Butte miners had no organization at all. The International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers came to Butte in 1917, but it went without



recognition till 1934.

The Company found itself in a new and rather hostile political environment as a result of Montana's second population boom from 1905 to 1920. This surge in population was the flood of farmers who came to "make the desert blossom like a rose." As their numbers grew, the farmers became a real challenge to the Company's control of the state's political machinery. For the copper trust's hold on labor was not something it could use to bind the farmer. The threat of a shut-down, the Company's strategy when labor began making noises, simply meant nothing to the farmer, especially when he was facing a crop failure and a notice of foreclosure by a banker. The major fear of the Company was an alliance of labor and farmers. Such an alliance did not formalize until the 1930's when the Democratic party forged a fragile coalition between the two groups. Their informal relation had been common anger and frustration on a wide basis, "ranging from railroad rates and high prices to corporate control of the machinery of government."<sup>26</sup> It is within this relationship - farmer and labor joining forces - that mining politics and agricultural politics overlap.

The history of agricultural politics revolves around two products, cattle and grains, and two eras, the open range and homesteading. When the open range was coming to an end with Montana's admission to the Union, the cattleman was for all practical purposes the only agricultural force in the state. Yet, the cattleman was not a counter-force to mining politics, which the farmer became at a



later date. There are two reasons for this. First, the range cattle business was in its classic period, 1865 to 1885, when mining efforts were still very much individual entrepreneurships. The two industries, cattlemen associations and successful mine operators, together became the apostles of individualism. Secondly, to a certain extent the financial structure that supported mining also found its way into cattle companies. Like mining, cattle companies were treated largely as speculative investments. It was propagandized that a steer worth \$30 could be produced in Montana for \$3.50.<sup>27</sup>

For example, Sam Hauser, a leading entrepreneur in Montana who was involved in mining, banking, railroad construction, real estate, etc., wrote:

We know all a man has to do is to brand his cattle and go to sleep; he needn't wake up for a year and still his ability to pay will be unquestioned . . . We know of none who are not on a short and sure road to fortune. Room? Why we have hardly more than a cow for every square mile of pasture in the Territory. Risk? There is almost none.<sup>28</sup>

Taking his own advice, Hauser and two other successful Montana businessmen, A. J. Davis and Granville Stuart, pooled a large sum of capital and began a cattle company. The political maneuvers used to secure the 800 acres of land illegally claimed for the DHS ranch are indicative of the land conflicts between open range practice and the Homestead Act. The law restricted settlement to 160 free acres and another 160 acres at \$1.25 an acre (i.e., until the law was altered in 1891). But when it became apparent that 20 to 25 acres of land were required per head of cattle in the plains





region, cattle companies oftentimes illegally fenced for their own use large acres of the range, even when part or all of it belonged to the public domain. The DHS claim was not only illegally founded but it also was on the boundaries of a fort reservation. After the army made its presence known by helping themselves to DHS hay, Davis and Hauser went to work on Montana's Territorial delegate, M. Maginnis, to exert his influence for their cause. Maginnis was successful in his endeavors, and "on May 20, 1882, General Orders No. 12 of the Department of Dakota modified the military reservation so as to return to the [DHS] ranch most of the lands the DHS claimed by squatter's rights."<sup>29</sup>

The large cattle companies, just prior to the turn of the century, were driven from the open range as small ranchers, sheepmen, and farmers began legally to fence off the range into homesteads. But the large cattlemen did not become extinct. In 1902, for instance, John Holt, a large cattle operator in Custer County, bought 65,000 acres. The large cattle companies were able to adapt to the reluctant closing of the open range through the purchase or lease of railroad and state-leased lands.

A change in the cattle production methods was also required by the large companies if they were to survive. After the severe winter of 1886-1887 and tremendous losses of cattle through the open-range method (which was, after branding, to turn the cattle loose on the open range with little thought of controlled breeding, shelter, or supplemental winter feeding), the companies were forced to expand



the operations to include hay harvesting and wintering of herds. But as production methods became more costly and with the closure of the lands which had offered free grazing, the large cattle company lost its speculative attraction.

The second agricultural era began midway through the first decade of the new century. With a revised Homestead Act in 1909 to increase the free land unit to 320 acres, and extensive dry land farming promotion efforts by railroads and others, a mass migration of people inundated the Montanan plains. It has been estimated that between 70,000 and 80,000 people poured into eastern and central Montana between 1909 and 1918.<sup>30</sup> The number of farms in eastern Montana rose from 7,000 in 1900 to 46,000 in 1920.

A shockingly large proportion of the settlers arrived with no prior experience in farming. Toole reported a study conducted in the north-central district of Montana which cited that 51 percent of the new homesteaders had no previous agricultural background. That same study listed 70 percent of those who had settled with no prior farming experience as failing and abandoning the land, and furthermore, that 48 percent of those having farming experience also ended in deserting their farms.<sup>31</sup> While the mad rush to grab land had drawn many experienced and inexperienced agriculturists to Montana, it was not merely the "greenhorn" who failed. The overwhelming reason for failure was the unpredictable droughts.

The years between 1917 and 1919 marked a great drought for the plains of Montana, and a time of extreme hardship for the newly settled.



Howard graphically portrayed the forces of nature:

[the] winds were the first "dusters" the northern plains farmer had ever seen. Day after day he watched, first incredulous, then despairing, as the gale whipped his fields into the sky. He saw his \$1,000 worth of seed blown out of the ground in forty-eight hours, and still the relentless wind tore at his land. He saw the dust driven through the flimsy walls of the homestead shack while his wife put the children to bed and covered their faces with wet cloths which dried in a few moments. There was no day or night for nearly a week; and then, after a few days' respite, the wind began again. When it was over at last dust was drifted against the doorway like snow and the seven-foot-high tractor was buried to the roof of its cab.<sup>32</sup>

The results of the drought were devastating. An estimated 60,000 settlers fled the state. And in 1921, when the remaining farmers finally had a crop to sell, the bottom of the market had fallen out. Wheat was selling for \$2.35 a bushel in December, 1919 (still a high price because of the wartime economy and huge exports to a war-torn Europe); however, by the time a productive year rolled around, wheat had dropped to \$ .85 a bushel in December, 1921.<sup>33</sup> Between 1921 and 1925, one out of every two Montana farmers lost his farm by mortgage foreclosure.<sup>34</sup> This period of time also saw Montana's farm tenancy rate skyrocket. From 1910 to 1925 the number of farm tenants increased from 2,000 to 10,000.<sup>35</sup> This pattern continued and by the end of the 1930's less than one acre in five was owned by the farmer working it. By the end of the 1930's, " . . . the state's bankruptcy rate was highest in the country."<sup>36</sup>

Corresponding to the high farm-failure rate, Montana lost half of its banks between 1921 and 1925. While the "over-banking"





condition was due to federal and state foolishness in granting so many charters, there was a distinct patterning of those charters which were able to survive: "more state banks failed than national; more small banks failed than large; more county banks failed than city banks; more new banks failed than old; more failed east of the Continental Divide than west."<sup>37</sup>

There were two ways in which the state government reacted to the initial deluge of farmers and then to their plight and exodus. Both proved to be counterproductive. First, in 1915 the legislature abdicated its tight control over the creation of new counties in light of a massive population growth. In accordance with the Leighton Act, the power of government to subdivide itself was granted to the existent counties. "All that was necessary for a county to divide was for certain minimum property evaluations to exist in the proposed new (and old) county areas and for petitions to be signed and elections to be held."<sup>38</sup> The consequences were disastrous. Twenty-eight new counties were carved out of the old ones between 1910 and 1925. And, of course, this meant that there were new courthouses built, new sheriffs and clerks hired, new roads, bridges, and schools constructed, new surveys made by new county surveyors, new judges, and, above all else, new, heavy taxes to pay for it all. It was reported that between 1914 and 1922 county administration costs rose by 149 percent; highways, bridges, and ferries, up 138 percent; and education, schools, and libraries grew 172 percent. To pay for the rapidly rising costs of governmental growth, the increased taxation was almost exclusively on



property. It was reported that taxes per acre rose 140 percent in this period. But when the vast exodus began, government was left with a piddling tax base, and in many circumstances the county ended up confiscating property. "Overall, county land ownership increased nearly 5,000 percent with a concomitant drop in the valuation of farm land of \$32,000,000 and a delinquency account of \$18,000,000."<sup>39</sup>

Government also blundered when it failed to respond to the greater needs of the farmer during and after the 1917-1919 drought. While a state board of hail insurance was established for the farmer in 1917 and, beginning in 1918, state aid was made available for buying seed, for the most part the government's only action was inaction. Bag-fulls of mail were written Governor Stewart pleading for assistance to the stricken farmers. One bitter farmer wrote:

A lot of settlers here have already moved to Canada for they say that the Canadian government is helping farmers much more than the United States government. Unless the government is willing to do something for the homesteaders here right soon, we will all have to nail up our windows and go.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, after conditions reached catastrophic stages, the governor called a special session of the legislature in July, 1919.<sup>41</sup> On the theory that destitute farmers could be hired for road work, the legislature passed a law providing the county commissioners with the discretionary right to issue bonds for new road construction. Since there were no takers on the bonds, very little relief construction was begun. With the bill's passage, the legislature adjourned and the crisis remained.



Professor Clinch noted that many of Montana's farmers who settled after the completion of the Northern Pacific in 1883, brought with them an agrarian attitude favoring reform and change.<sup>42</sup> In addition to his attitudes, the farmer also carried with him his tradition of agrarian organizations. As early as 1873 Montana was introduced to its first local grange. However, due to a lack of a liaison among the local groups the Montana Grange soon disappeared in the early 1880's. Following this, there appeared scattered branches of the Farmers' Alliance between 1885 and 1889. But by the time the Alliance began to coordinate itself with a centralized state organization, the Populist party had emerged (by 1892) and the Alliance was quickly assimilated within the ranks of the new political organization. The Populist era ended just at the beginnings of dryland farmer immigration. And as the times grew harder for the new farmer, he sought relief and voiced his discontent through the Non-Partisan League and the Montana Society of Equity, both extreme left movements in their times.

Sheridan County, a wheat-county in the extreme northeast corner of the state, has the most radical record among the agrarian counties.<sup>43</sup> Initially settled by Scandinavians, the county had witnessed the successful operation of Danish cooperatives several years before the 1920's and 1930's period of so-called radical economic movements. In 1932 this county gave 576 votes to Communist candidates for each office, the largest block of votes the party received in the entire state, and it accounted for slightly less than 50 percent of the



entire state's popular vote for William Z. Foster, the Communist Presidential candidate.

The Farmers' Union is presently the largest farm organization in Montana. The combined membership of two other farmers' groups in the state, the Farm Bureau and the Grange, is less than half its membership. The Farm Bureau and stockmen are the extreme conservative force of the agricultural community, while the Farmers' Union takes more of a liberal position.

The heritage of mining and agricultural politics, as reviewed above, has been a powerful force in determining the future for Montanans. While out of state market conditions, to which the state's economy is so reliant, largely governed the cycles of prosperity and poverty, the general welfare of the state's citizenry has been affected by the government's management or mismanagement of its natural resource politics. What resulted was the transformation of "the Company" into a corporate power structure. The emergence of the Montana Power Company as another strong corporation in addition to the copper industry did not pose a threat to A.M.C.'s political hold on the state; rather, it presented the Anaconda Company with an ally. Incorporated originally in 1912 as a New Jersey corporation, Montana Power (which subsequently reincorporated in Montana on November 30, 1961) began its operations with the consolidation of the Butte Electric and Power Company, the Madison River Power Company, the Billings and Eastern Montana Power Company, the Missouri River Electric and Power Company, the Great Falls Power Company, and the





Thompson Falls Power Company. In the 1920's the utility began planning and operating a network of hydroelectric dams in the state. Then, in the 1930's it started acquiring extensive oil and natural gas properties, plus gas transmission lines and distribution systems to which it has made many subsequent additions. Besides Montana Power's interests in the state's gas reserves, a few of the major oil companies became interested in Montana's petroleum production. While oil was first tapped in 1915, production developed only in modest quantities until major discoveries in 1951. Since that time, the oil companies have built refineries in the state, particularly around the Billings area which has experienced rapid urbanization since 1950. In 1954 Montana Power increased its natural gas holdings by obtaining the Montana-Dakota Utilities' properties and facilities in the Great Falls-Havre region of north-central Montana. Thus, Montana Power's expansion began with municipal and industrial utilities, moved into hydroelectric dam construction in the 1920's-1930's, engulfed natural gas holdings between 1930's-1950's, and now, the corporation's most recent sprawl has been into coal-fired steam-electric generating plants. The company is currently constructing two 350-megawatt power plants in Coalstrip. Montana Power's strip-mining policy and power plant construction in eastern Montana has brought about a new controversy over land use. The opposition to coal development is not limited to environmentalist groups but also includes the ranchers and farmers that stand the most to lose.

In addition to Montana Power and the Anaconda Company, the



corporate power structure is rounded out by the Burlington Northern railroad and the First Bank System. A study by Daniel Foley, reporter for the Billings Gazette, revealed that the four companies are "linked in a vast web of economic concentration: they have interlocking directorates, they retain the same prominent law firms and they have common business interests."<sup>44</sup> He noted that such an economic concentration has tremendous political clout, especially in dealings with the legislature, the courts and regulatory and tax agencies. As an idea of how incestuous the interlocking directorships are, there are twelve officials or directors of Montana banks in the First Bank System who are spread across the directorships of the remaining three corporate powers. Six of the bankers are Montana Power directors; six are linked to the Anaconda Company or one of its Montana subsidiaries; and one, J. E. Corette, is also a Burlington Northern director. In fact, J. E. Corette links three of the four corporations, Montana Power, Burlington Northern, and the First Bank System. An example of the political significance that the corporate power structure can provide for a political issue was the 1971 public referendum on government revenue. The issue was put to Montanans in the form of having to select a sales tax or a higher rate of progressive taxation on personal incomes. A Republican committee, Save Our State (S.O.S.), was struck to promote the sales tax. In its unsuccessful campaign, the committee reported having spent \$76,034 on behalf of a sales tax, of which \$20,000 each had been contributed by Montana Power, Burlington Northern and the Anaconda Company. Not only do the big corporations



share identical law firms and hold the same political convictions, they also conduct a great deal of business among themselves. For instance, Burlington Northern has leased coal land near Coalstrip to a Montana Power subsidiary, Western Energy Company, which in turn has been mining coal and shipping it to market on Burlington Northern trains. For another example, Montana Power's biggest customer is the Anaconda Company, which provides 13 cents of every dollar the utility receives.

Montana's legislative atmosphere fits Malcolm Jewell's succinct description: "The legislature is an arena for competing economic interests, all of which hope to make the state their ally in the free enterprise system."<sup>45</sup> While it is the case that Montana's legislature serves as an arena for competing interests, it is not necessarily the case that Montana's corporate power structure has to compete to make the state its ally. For the most part, the state has acquiesced in the companies' primacy in the economic security of Montana.

The relative success the big companies have had in controlling politics does not mean, however, that agricultural politics have been impotent. Agriculture has been quite successful in establishing state crop insurance programs, crop marketing regulations, and soil and water management programs. The interests of both domains have been well guarded.

### The Rise of the "New Politics"

After the Second World War, there were indications that the traditional base of Montana politics might undergo a change. The basic cause for this change was increasing urbanization. What made the cause effective was the decision of the United States Supreme





Court that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required equal legislative representation of districts (Baker v. Carr, 1962).

Montana's urbanization was not a linear development. While the urban population of the territory had been 18 percent in 1880, and the state's urban population 29 percent in 1890 and 35 percent in 1910, the homesteaders' movement brought it down to 31 percent in 1920. After the Second World War, however, Montana's urban population rose steadily to 42.8 percent in 1950, 50.2 percent in 1960, and 53.7 percent in 1970.

Rural overrepresentation diminished the political impact of this urbanization. In 1966, the first equitably apportioned legislature was elected. On the surface, little changed in partisan make-up or issue orientation of the members. However, Thomas Payne's hope, expressed in 1965, that "as the trend toward urbanization continues, a rustic politics which has emphasized political personalities will give ground to an urban politics which has greater interest in political issues (emphasis added)." <sup>46</sup>

During the 1960's Montana still had its original Constitution of 1889. Because the original document had been widely amended and because it faced a series of modernizing revisions in the near future, <sup>47</sup> a movement within governmental circles and citizen groups began to examine it in terms of its current viability. <sup>48</sup> A 1968 Legislative Council study concluded that there was need for substantial revision and improvement in the Constitution. <sup>49</sup> Furthermore, the Council



recommended that the legislature establish a Constitutional Revision Commission to make specific recommendations for change and to suggest the most feasible method of change. The 1969 Legislative Assembly followed the Council's report by designating the commission, and, during the same session, the legislature hurried the process toward possible constitutional reform by approving Referendum 67, which called for a constitutional convention. Later that same year, the Revision Commission unanimously endorsed a convention as the best method of constitutional change. The Referendum was to authorize the 1971 Legislative Assembly to call a convention to "revise, alter, or amend" the state's original Constitution. After Referendum 67 had been popularly approved by a 60,000-vote margin, in November 1970, the 1971 Legislative Assembly enacted legislation which provided for the selection of delegates, funding, and timetable of the convention. On November 2, 1971, one hundred delegates were elected to the Convention, 58 Democrats, 36 Republicans and 6 Independents.

As the Convention progressed over its nine-week session, its political significance evolved into more than just an assembly to produce a document. It did indeed become the catalytic force in the shaping of a "new politics"<sup>50</sup> for the state. The Convention, functioning as an open forum, provided a diversity of groups with the opportunity to raise numerous issues, which had heretofore been ignored within the existing political structure. Public hearings permitted discussions ranging from legalization of marijuana to a unicameral legislature. The president of the convention wrote:



The Montana Convention overlooked no opportunity to publicize its activities and to encourage public participation. Toward that end all of its deliberations, including all substantive and procedural committee meetings, were open to the public and press. . . . An open convention is not a painless one, and there were incidents and unfavorable publicity from time to time.<sup>51</sup>

Besides the variety of public input, the delegates of the Convention also were a source for the new politics. Of course, the inevitable challenge for the delegates became one of balancing reform with the status quo, and it was in the reform proposals that issues arose which were fresh in comparison to issues raised by the established interests. Only a handful of the delegates had held previous political office, so most delegates were innocent of any past association with the big interests. A reform coalition and a status quo bloc did emerge within the body. The nomination and election of the delegates had been conducted on a partisan basis; and although the delegates continually denied that they were acting in a partisan manner, a party difference did surface on key reform issues, even though there were no party caucuses nor attempts to enforce party discipline.<sup>52</sup> An examination by a newspaper bureau revealed that on nine important reform issues 57 percent of the Democrats voted for reform, while 68 percent of the Republicans voted against the reform measures.<sup>53</sup> Their analysis also showed an urban-rural division within the convention. The 50 delegates who lived in Billings, Butte, Missoula, Helena, Great Falls, Bozeman and Kalispell voted 58 percent for reform, while the 50 delegates from towns and rural areas voted 64 percent against reform. These divisions parallel those within the



the legislature and tend to suggest that the division over the reform issues of the Convention, while such issues were new for a Montana political body, had some roots in the state's political past.

Prior to the Convention most of the new issues lacked a legitimizing force in the political system. But upon completion of the Convention and after the passage of the new constitution,<sup>54</sup> the state was confronted with a new list of issues that were vocalized by newly emerging groups. The new constitution was a watershed for the new politics. It included major legislative reforms: annual sessions, single-member legislative districts, and an independent reapportionment commission. The taxation section was riddled of the mining tax exemption, and instead of protecting specific interests, the section became a broad and flexible statement on taxation. The governor and lieutenant governor now have to run for office as a team. The Bill of Rights was extended to include rights to participate in government deliberations, rights to know what government is doing, the right to privacy, children's rights, adulthood at age eighteen, nondiscrimination, and the right to have a clean and healthy environment. The section on the environment provided for land reclamation and state ownership of all water for the use of the people. These examples all reflect the interests expressed in the new politics.

### Setting for the Analysis

The crucial question emerging from the rise of the new politics in the state, is the relationship between the historically founded political issues and the issues of the new politics. The 1973





Legislative Assembly was entrusted with the duty of implementing the new constitution. It was a newly reapportioned assembly, showing the fairest apportionment in the state's history; incidentally, it was only the second popularly adjusted reapportionment in the state's history. It was a Democratic Capitol, with the party controlling the Legislative Assembly and the governorship; the first time that the Democrats dominated state politics since 1939. The Democratic caucus, when selecting the House leadership, revealed, as it had before, a coalition of organized labor and the Farmers' Union. Labor members supported a candidate for the Speaker of the House from Billings, the largest urban center in the state, while farm support was given to a member from a small rural community. The labor and urban Democrats united to elect the Speaker, and the agrarian Democratic faction was granted the Majority Leadership. The Republicans, reflecting their coalition of stockmen and business, professional and financial interests, chose a rancher as Minority Leader.

The legislative session found itself confronted with a record volume of introduced bills, partially because of constitutional implementation acts. Its voluminous workload forced the House leadership to establish a priority preference on bills to be considered. Constitutional implementation bills were given immediate attention. Then, a group of bills, with overlapping subject matter, dealing with environmental protection, coal-industry practices, utility and coal taxation, and consumer protection, dominated a large portion of the House's time. The revenue package also received priority. Bills that



were listed as having lower priority were held over for the second session (1974) of the 43rd Legislative Assembly. These included measures on gambling, executive reorganization, motor vehicle inspection, a uniform probate code, a number of property tax reform proposals, a direct presidential primary, and others. An assortment of legislation emerged in the 1973 session which involved new political issues as well as issues based on older interests. The divisions of conflict within the chamber pitted the old against the new politics, thus making supporting coalitions appear volatile.

The major problem for this thesis is to examine the nature of the relationship between the older and the new political issues. Are there constituency characteristics which better predict a legislator's position on old than on new political issues, or vice versa? It was earlier argued that economic regions played a major role in older political issues. Do regional influences also explain positions on new political issues? How much of behavior variance on old as against new political issues is explained by other characteristics, such as political party? These are the main questions that will be addressed. Overall, the main investigation is to determine whether positions taken on older and new political issues have similar or diverse origins of support.



## CHAPTER III

### THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The previous chapter established the historical context from which the research problem of this study arises. It is now necessary to describe how this problem can be approached from within a specific research design. While there are clearly several ways of investigating the questions posed in this research problem, my predilection to social scientific inquiry is of a quantitative, empirical bent. Fred Kerlinger, noted behavioral scientist, has categorized two basic approaches for conducting behavioral research -- the experimental and the ex post facto approach.<sup>1</sup> The distinction between the two approaches is that the former provides direct control and manipulation of one or more independent variables. "In the ex post facto research situation, this kind of control of the independent variables is not possible. The investigator must take things as they are and try to disentangle them."<sup>2</sup>

In addition to the issue of control, that is, experimental versus ex post facto research, there are the factors of time, situation, and breadth which the researcher has to shape into some particular design. Respectively, the researcher has the choice of structuring his study in a diachronic or in a synchronic period, in a natural or in an artificial setting, as a case study or as a survey.

The research design employed herein uses an ex post facto-synchronic-natural-case study approach. The independent variables in this study -- political party, (economic-geographic) region, and constituency characteristics -- were observed without control by the investigator. The research is contained within an isolated time





period, that is, the 1973 session of the Montana Legislative Assembly. The setting is natural: the Montana House of Representatives. Finally, the research is a case study of the Montana House of Representatives, and it is not an explanation of legislative voting behavior in general.

Three basic aspects of this plan of analysis need to be described. First, the data set, from which all phases of the study are evaluated, needs to be identified. Second, as suggested in the record of legislative voting studies, the methods and strategies involved in constructing issue dimensions must be clarified. Finally, the rationale in examining the dependent variables in terms of a specific set of independent variables has to be discussed.

1. The Data Set. Basically, there are two data sets used in this study. One set was constructed from all of the votes taken in the 1973 Montana House of Representatives which were of a high conflict nature. It includes House Bills, House Resolutions, House Joint Resolutions, or procedural motions regarding one of these types of legislation. The criterion for a conflict measure was that at least twenty-five out of 100 House members voted in opposition. What may appear as an arbitrary cutting point really is not. First, this criterion follows one of the traditional decision-making rules of the chamber -- the three-fourths agreement rule on critical matters. Second, a group of twenty-five, voting in opposition, are more likely to exhibit organized, formalized dissent than a scattered few who voted against almost every measure. (One old-timer voted against everything on the rationale that there were too many laws on the books).

Out of well over 1500 votes taken in the House, around 500 qualified as conflict measures. Of this number, close to 200 were discarded because



they dealt with legislation originating in the state Senate. Because the Senate is apportioned differently and its constituencies overlap House districts, it was decided, for reasons which will become more apparent later, to use only measures originating from within the House. From these remaining votes, another subset was drawn which culled repetitious items. In the end, 178 votes formed the data from which issue areas were supplied.

Two issue domains, consistent with the arguments made in Chapter II, were used further to categorize the data set -- traditional and "new politics" issues. Subsumed within the traditional domain were the following issue areas: taxation, education, agriculture, labor relations, and state representation and electoral reform. The "new politics" contained issue areas on consumer protection, environmental protection, and "new" morality issues. These categories, for both issue domains, were selected on the basis of an understanding of Montana politics. At this point, vote tallies were sorted into the categories based on a content analysis of the short titles of the bills and resolutions in the data set. This procedure is enhanced by the fact that Montana law requires all bill and resolution titles to express what subject matter is being addressed. Issue categories were not mutually exclusive. If a piece of legislation covered more than one of the issue areas, it was classified in each relevant category.

To summarize, the sampling procedure for the first data set provided the universe of votes on House Bills, House Resolutions, House Joint Resolutions, and procedural motions on these types of legislation according



to the conflict criterion. From this complete set, the universe of votes for each issue category was established. Because universal sets were created, it made significance testing superficial in regards to the analysis of these votes.

The second data set involved collecting items to serve as independent variables. In particular, it involved the collection of constituency characteristics from the twenty-three legislative districts which make up the House. Montana's House was apportioned according to multi-member districts. Overall, the House was composed of ten two-member districts, six four-members districts, four six-member districts, one eight-member district, and two twelve-member districts. Hence, aggregate data were computed for each legislative district, and each legislator from a particular district shared those selected constituency characteristics with the other members of that district.

Aggregate data were pooled from the 1970 U.S. census of Montana. Since legislative districts followed county lines<sup>3</sup>, general social and economic characteristics for the counties was obtained. And then, district data were computed by combining the proper counties. Constituency characteristics were chosen on the basis of three classes of indicators: social, economic, and social-welfare. Since these indicators were assigned as individual attributes of each House member, the problem of estimating sampling parameters is for all practical purposes moot, especially because the full House is the universe of cases.

To summarize, the individual cases of this study were the 100 members of the 1973 Montana House of Representatives. Two groupings of variables were collected for each legislator. One set involved



each member's vote on the pieces of legislation considered relevant to this study, while the second listed the chosen constituency characteristics. The former variables were used to construct the issue dimensions which serve as the dependent variables of this study, while the latter set of variables constitutes a pool of independent variables.

2. The Dependent Variables. The votes on the legislation within each of the issue categories were coded so that an aye vote, an abstention or absence and a nay vote became +1, 0, and -1, respectively. Using this ranking, a matrix of zero-order correlations were computed for each issue category.<sup>4</sup> These coefficients were then subjected to a hierarchical cluster analysis<sup>5</sup> as a preliminary step to factor analyzing the matrices. The clusters revealed the structural relationship among the variables and indicated how many groupings of the coefficients actually existed in the data of each issue area. Also gleaned from this analysis was the identification of isolates among the variables. From these observations, two decisions were made. First, isolates would be excluded from the factor analyses because of their independence of the other variables, which would be reflected in each factor analysis as an individual factor. Second, the nature of the cluster structures suggested that some of the issue areas were quite complex. Thus, it was decided that only up to three factors would be retained from each factor analysis and that these three, together, must account for at least 60% of the common variance. Upon examining the factor analyses of the issue areas, the taxation and education issue areas were dropped because the complexity of their factor solutions failed to meet the above conditions.





A principal-factors-with-iterations solution was selected as the factoring technique.<sup>6</sup> This factoring method assumes that a variable can be decomposed into a part which is due to common factors and a part which is unique. To estimate the part common with other factors, which is referred to as the communality, the squared multiple correlation between a particular variable and the rest of the variables in a matrix is calculated for each variable and such estimates then become the main diagonal of the matrix. It is from this adjusted matrix that the solution is then produced. Upon receiving each solution for the issue areas, the clusterings of the variables were examined to see whether or not they were related. If the clusterings were near orthogonal, that solution was kept.<sup>7</sup> However, if the clusterings were other than at right angles to each other, an oblique rotation was conducted so as to run the two axes through the centers of these clusterings.

From the final rotated-factor solutions, factor-score coefficients were calculated for each factor that was retained. These factors then became the issue dimensions which are referenced from here on out. With these coefficients, individual scores were calculated for each member of the House. Since these scores were standardized, they run usually between  $\pm 2$ . These scores represent the position each legislator took on the respective issue dimensions. The variation in such scores became the underlying subject of analysis in this study.

3. The Multivariate Analyses. Before discussing the method used to explain variations on each issue dimension, it must be noted that the independent variables are of two types. First, two variables, political



party and region, are categorical in nature. The constituency variables, however, are interval. Overall then, the data used to interpret legislative voting behavior are of two kinds: the dependent and constituency variables are interval, while party and region are categorical. This is important because the selection of the multivariate analytic technique depended highly upon the nature of the data.

Because it was very desirable to obtain a decomposition of the variation on each of the issue dimensions, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted.<sup>8</sup> This allows one to explain the effect each independent variable has in accounting for variation in the dependent variable. The statistics for significance testing generated from the ANOVA were largely ignored because of their inapplicability, as already noted. However, the level of significance for the two-way interaction effect (a non-additive effect) was observed. The overall size of the interaction effect provides a clue to when it is important, but the significance level is a more distinct alarm to non-additive effects. The ANOVA as applied to this study was a factorial design with unequal cell frequencies. The approach used to partition the total sum of squares was the classic experimental approach.<sup>9</sup>

In conjunction with the ANOVA, multiple classification analysis (MCA) was conducted.<sup>10</sup> This is a method which permits one better to display the results of ANOVA and portrays the net effect of each independent variable when the differences of the other variables are controlled for. For the purposes of MCA, categorical variables are referenced as factors and metric variables are designated as covariates. Thus, in this study, party and region are referred to as factors and the constituency characteristics are specified as covariates.



The value of this method, for the purposes of this study, is that it permits one to evaluate in a stepwise fashion the actual effect the independent variables have on the dependent variable. Furthermore, one can control the order in which the factors or covariates are entered into the solution depending upon any hypothesized arrangement of the effects of the factors and covariates. The statistics generated from MCA are equivalent to a dummy regression. Included with the results is an  $R^2$  and multiple R. To evaluate the unadjusted and adjusted effects of the factors and covariates, the analysis also provides eta and beta coefficients. The square of eta notes the proportion of variance explained by a categorical variable. The square of beta indicated the extent to which a variable accounts for the remaining variance unexplained by the other independent variables.

To summarize, MCA was the multivariate technique used to explain the impact of party, region, and constituency characteristics on the issue dimensions. This technique was used because of its applicability to categorical variables and because it portrays succinctly the effects of the independent variables.





## CHAPTER IV

### ISSUE AREAS IN THE 43rd SESSION OF THE MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: TRADITIONAL AND "NEW POLITICS"

The preceding three chapters have provided the necessary background for an analysis of data relevant to the central questions of this thesis. Each chapter has been an essential, preliminary step leading to such an analysis: a statement of the problem to be considered, an account of the historical setting to that problem, and a description of the research procedures to be used in investigating various aspects of that problem. This chapter presents the first stage of the analysis on the data collected in the study.

The initial task in any analysis is the isolation and description of the phenomena that one desires to explain. In the methodological language of the social sciences, such a task is one of determining and describing the "dependent variables" of the study. The present chapter is devoted to that undertaking. Here, the presentation is made of the efforts to distinguish and identify consistent patterns in the votes cast by members of the Montana House of Representatives on policy questions and procedural matters in selected issue areas that arose before the chamber.

Five kinds of questions were asked about the nature of the legislative voting patterns that constitute the dependent variables in this study. First, it was inquired whether there even existed in data on roll-call votes distinguishable patterns of consistent voting by legislators with respect to specific issue areas.

Secondly, having found such patterns within an issue area,



along how many phases of that issue are the members of the House ordered? That is, does one find a single, over-riding dimension that separates the entire membership into particular voting blocs? Or, are there several phases of that issue area which array the legislators across many dimensions?

Thirdly, what is the substantive nature of each voting pattern dimension? Indeed, it is desirable to identify such dimensions in substantive terms and, perhaps, even give them descriptive labels.

Fourthly, having detected the presence of such patterns, having considered their complexity, and having identified their substantive character, one can provide each legislator with a "score" indicating his own consistency in voting on each dimension of the issue areas in question. Hence, it is appropriate to ask how such scores are distributed on each of the dimensions. All of the following questions bear upon the description of such distributions: Are these distributions uni-modal, bi-modal or multi-modal? How polarized are they? And, what is the overall extent of variation among the scores?

Finally, one would want to know how legislators' scores on one dimension relate to their scores on the other dimensions, both within and across particular issue areas.

In all, these five kinds of questions outline the discussion of the issue areas selected in this thesis. However, before undertaking such a discussion, it is important first to review the rationale behind roll-call voting analyses of legislative behavior. The chapter will conclude with remarks on the relations between and among issue area dimensions.



### The Rationale of Roll-Call Voting Analysis

If a legislator persistently commits himself to support a particular position regarding matters of policy in a given issue area, one would expect such a commitment to be reflected in his voting on legislative motions which have to do with that issue area. In other words, one expects the votes he casts on such motions to reveal a certain patterning of "ayes" and "nays" as the substance of the motions reflects support or rejection of his own position. This expectation serves as the basis underlying roll-call voting analyses of legislative behavior. The fundamental assumption is that an individual legislator's patterning of votes in a given issue area indicates the position that legislator takes regarding the issue in question. By the same token, a set of non-patterned votes suggests that the legislator lacks a commitment to some specific position regarding the issue.

However, such expectations pertain only to the patterning found in the voting behavior of an individual legislator. Yet, the arguments advanced by most roll-call voting analysts of legislative behavior extend beyond the micro-level of analysis, i.e., the level of the individual case. In particular, such analysts are generally concerned with detecting divisions that section the membership of a legislative body into distinct voting "blocs" or coalitions on specific issue areas. The existence of such blocs implies that there is some underlying dimension(s) which accounts for the consistent voting patterns on an issue area. Furthermore, it is assumed that



legislators can be placed along such a dimension according to the consistency with which they support a particular position within that issue area. Inasmuch as a particular issue area is multi-faceted in character, one might expect more than one dimension to appear for such a complex issue grouping. Moreover, one would anticipate the several dimensions reflecting voting alignments on complex issues to be either independent of or correlated with one another. The arguments based on these assumptions provide the strategy for delineating the voting coalitions to be found in a given issue area, which is one of the primary goals of such analyses.

Such a strategy is also employed in this study in an attempt to determine the existence of voting coalitions in the Montana House of Representatives which, as will be examined in Chapter Five, may be related to the cleavage systems that have historically emerged in Montana state politics. The scope of this analysis, regarding the existence of such patterned voting in the legislature, has been confined to two sets of issue areas: traditional issues and those pertaining to the "new politics" of recent years. The results of the analysis are reported for each of these two broad classifications. Such results were generated from the data on all votes taken on motions relating to an issue area which satisfied the criteria of selection and retention set out in Chapter Three. These votes were subjected to factor analysis in the manner previously described.<sup>1</sup> The first broad issue area to be addressed is the traditional issue groupings.





### Traditional Interest Issues:

Initially, five issue areas were considered as traditional interest issues: agriculture, education, state representational and electoral practices, labor relations, and taxation. Since it was desirable to retain only those issue groupings which were, at the most, three dimensional and whose dimensionality was still capable of explaining a sizeable proportion of the variance among the votes within each issue grouping,<sup>2</sup> the education and the taxation issue sets were dropped. Both of these groupings were so multi-faceted that the complexity of their voting pattern structures exceeded the designs of this study. The three remaining traditional issue sets were kept and their descriptions follow in alphabetical order.

I. Agricultural Issues. The interests of the agricultural community are, of course, well articulated and represented in the state legislature. The dominant political divisions within this interest sector, which are basically organized along the lines of ranching and grain farming, are highly politicized. The Democratic party receives the support of the Farmers Union, a liberal farm organization, while the Republican party is frequently endorsed by the conservative Montana Stockgrowers Association and the American Farm Bureau Federation, an ultraconservative agri-business organization. Thus, agricultural legislation is often contested along party lines, especially legislation which deals with state-provided services to the agricultural sector.

In searching for the existence of stable voting patterns regarding proposed legislation relevant to this issue area, nine votes, having to



do with seven separate bills, were classified as falling within the agricultural issues category. The intercorrelation matrix formed across the nine votes was then factor analyzed in the manner described above. Two principal components emerged from the analysis. Taken together, these two components accounted for 86.2% of the total variance analyzed. The axes representing the two components were then rotated to clarify the interpretation of the underlying dimensions involved. Since two clusters of votes were produced by the factor solution, the axes were rotated through the center of these clusterings. This required an oblique rotation which positioned the axes such that the correlation between the two components is  $-0.67$ .

For the sake of easy reference, the two dimensions have been names AGRI 1 and AGRI 2. Loadings of the individual votes on each of these factors are given in Table 4.1. The communalities of each of the votes, taken as variables, are also listed there. Since the factor rotation was an oblique one, it must be noted that the voting patterns detected from these dimensions are negatively correlated. Thus, many of the proponents on one of the dimensions were the opponents on the other dimension.

The first dimension, AGRI 1, represents state governmental administration policies on agriculture. The three votes which load heaviest on this dimension all relate to matters on state administered services or policies. First, there is the third reading vote on House Bill (HB) 241, which sought the transferral of the State Board of Hail Insurance from the jurisdiction of the State Auditor, an indep-



endly elected official, to the state executive's Department of Agriculture. This piece of legislation brought a cry of partisan disapproval from the House Republicans. The State Auditor was a Republican, while all of the state executive departments were under the control of a Democratic governor. The Republicans claimed that the motive behind HB 241 was to reduce the influence of a Republican-held office. The other two votes were third readings on HB 180 and HB 132. Respectively, these bills dealt with an executive reorganization step to abolish the State Conservation Commission and with an act to regulate corporate farming in an effort to protect the family farm. Both of these bills were sponsored by Democratic members of the House, and the proposed Family Farm Act was part of the state Democratic party platform.

TABLE 4.1 Oblique-Rotated Structure Matrix for House Bills Composing the Agricultural Issue Area

House Bill No.	<u>Factor Loadings</u>		
	<u>AGRI 1<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>AGRI 2<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>h<sup>2</sup></u>
HB 72	-0.5744	0.4163	0.337
HB 96	0.3985	-0.1401	0.200
HB 108	0.5747	-0.3135	0.356
HB 132	0.6729	-0.3784	0.463
HB 180	0.7714	-0.4486	0.611
HB 241	0.8354	-0.4930	0.715
HB 468a	-0.2528	0.6244	0.446
HB 468b	-0.5521	0.7927	0.647
HB 468c	-0.5860	0.7665	0.607

a. State Governmental Administration Policies for Agriculture

b. Protection of the Commercial Feed Industry from Governmental Regulation



This factor's overriding concern for matters of state agricultural policies obviously lends to the substantive interpretation of AGRI 1. This dimension accounts for 62.9% of the common variance of the two factors retained. In terms of legislators' positions on the dimension, a positive score on AGRI 1 represents a favorable stand on the state agricultural policies mentioned above. Figure 4.1 presents a histogram of the legislators' scores on this factor. The distribution of these scores is U-shaped and bi-modal. The House is clearly divided on this dimension. Fifty-two per cent of the members are on the positive side of the scale, while 48% received negative scores. The general U-shape of the distribution suggests that the legislators were grouped along solidly contested lines.

On the other hand, AGRI 2, measures the position that legislators took on the question of governmental regulation of one of the retailing services to farmers. The dimension specifically represents support in protecting the commercial feed industry from the regulation scheme of HB 468. Three votes on separate amendments to HB 468, which were supportive of the feed industry, load heaviest on AGRI 2. The only other vote with a positive loading on this factor is one on a pro-business amendment to HB 72, the bill which sought to license and bond grain merchandisers. This dimension obviously measures the division between the producers in the agricultural industry and that industry's suppliers and marketers.

The pattern of scores on AGRI 2, (see Figure 4.2), reveals a skewed distribution of the legislators. While the division of negative





FIGURE 4.1      AGRI 1  
STATE AGRICULTURAL POLICIES







FIGURE 4.2      AGRI 2  
FEED INDUSTRY REGULATION





and positive scores remains comparable to that of AGRI 1 as 52% of the legislators are on the positive side of AGRI 2 and 48% are on the negative, the grouping of the legislators on this dimension is notably different than that for AGRI 1. For example, the extreme negative interval contains 30% of the legislators. This concentration exhibits a strong opposition to the issue at hand, while the relatively flat distribution on the positive side of the dimension indicates a wide diversity among legislators in the consistency with which they supported this particular interest. As far as common variance attributed to this dimension, AGRI 2 accounted for 23.3% of the variance analyzed.

II. Labor Relation Issues. Because of the large labor force in the mining industry, legal standards regarding working conditions have been an issue in Montana since statehood. Historically, the representatives from Silver Bow and Deer Lodge counties have been the guardians and spokesmen for labor, as well as securing the interests of the major employers in these counties, the Anaconda Company and Montana Power Company. Liberal labor leaders, like the more liberal elements of the farming community, have carried their cause through the Democratic party. However, not all of organized labor in the state tends to be a bastion of liberalism. Rather, organized labor supports liberal programs for the labor force, but has been more conservative on other domestic issues.

Eleven votes, on eleven different House bills, were classified under the labor relations issue category. The intercorrelation matrix formed across the eleven votes was then factor analyzed. One principal



component resulted from the analysis (see Table 4.2). This single factor accounted for 67.1% of the total variance. Because it was a unidimensional solution, there was no need for a factor rotation.

TABLE 4.2 Principal Component Loadings for House Bills Composing the Labor Relations Issue Area

<u>House Bill No.</u>	<u>Factor Loadings</u>	
	<u>LABOR<sup>a</sup></u>	<u><math>h^2</math></u>
HB 44	0.7187	0.516
HB 158	0.8751	0.766
HB 176	0.8355	0.698
HB 214	0.8901	0.792
HB 253	0.7057	0.498
HB 264	-0.8817	0.777
HB 294	0.8277	0.685
HB 357	0.8435	0.711
HB 372	0.6995	0.489
HB 445	0.6954	0.484
HB 488	0.7931	0.629


a. Expanded Employee Benefits

This single dimension, labeled as LABOR, was interpreted as representing an expanded employee benefits factor. The four votes most important to the substantive interpretation of LABOR all relate to matters of workmen's compensation. The heaviest loading on this dimension is a second reading vote on HB 214, which provided for an increase in the maximum weekly benefit amount received in compensation. HB 158, which also has a heavy loading, sought the expansion of the Workmen's Compensation Act to include coverage for disability from mental or nervous system injury. Another vote that contributed to





FIGURE 4.3 LABOR  
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS





the interpretation of this factor was on HB 357, which exempted certain cases from disqualification of compensation benefits. The only heavily negative loading on this factor was on a substitute-motion vote to the committee report on HB 264, which was a Republican-sponsored bill to increase the maximum benefit amount for compensation. The original motion on this bill was a "do-not-pass" recommendation from committee, while the effect of the substitute motion was to change the content of that vote to the matter of a recommended "do pass." The Democrats charged that HB 264 had been introduced to embarrass the labor-supporting Democrats, especially since the Republicans knew that the bill would be defeated because of its excessively high benefit listings. Rather than defeat the measure, the House Democrats tabled HB 264 indefinitely, where it eventually perished.

Those legislators supporting labor benefit proposals received positive scores on this dimension. Figure 4.3 shows a histogram of all legislators' scores on LABOR. This distribution is clearly U-shaped and bi-modal. The two extreme intervals suggest a strong division within this issue area. Thirty-four per cent of the legislators were fully supportive of increasing employee benefits, while a sizable opposition of 22% were solidly against the measures. Overall, 57% of the legislators are on the positive side of the scale, while the remaining 43% received negative scores.

III. State Representational and Electoral Practices. The rituals of electing public officials have been under continual examination by the state's two predominant political subcultures, the individualistic and moralistic subcultures.<sup>3</sup> For example, in 1954



followers of the moralistic subculture succeeded in winning a referendum providing for a direct Presidential primary. But after the 1956 Presidential election, there emerged an individualistic faction within the legislature large enough to defeat the popular-oriented practice of a Presidential primary. The representational philosophies of the two political subcultures are frequently at odds in the legislature, and the Forty-Third Legislative Assembly was no different.

Eight votes, on seven different House bills, were categorized in the state representational and electoral practices issue area. The intercorrelation matrix formed across the eight votes was factor analyzed as outlined above. Two principal components emerged from the analysis which met the significance criteria of this study. Together, these two components accounted for 62.7% of the total variance analyzed. The axes representing the two components were then rotated to clarify the meaning of the dimensions involved. Because the factor solution had yielded two clusters of votes, the axes were rotated so as to pass through the center of these clusterings. This required an oblique rotation. The resulting solution located the axes so that they had a correlation of  $-0.50$ . These two dimensions have been named ELECT 1 and ELECT 2. Loadings and communalities of the individual votes on each of the factors are given in Table 4.3.

The first dimension, ELECT 1, is clearly a factor relating to the expansion of popular control of representation. HB 559, which has the heaviest loading on ELECT 1, provided for a more lenient voter registration procedure, the effect of which would be to facilitate popular participation in elections. The vote on HB 570, which called



for a constitutional amendment to reinstate biennial sessions of the legislative assembly, was on a committee report recommending that the bill "do-not-pass." Those voting for the committee report were taking a stand in favor of a full time, more professional legislature, rather than supporting the amateur-prone biennial session. Two other votes loaded heavily on ELECT 1. These votes involved HB 268 and HB 257. The former bill restricted campaign expenditures for candidates to the state legislature, while the latter one provided for the recall of county commissioners.

TABLE 4.3 Oblique-Rotated Structure Matrix for House Bills Composing the State Representational and Electoral Practices Issue Area

<u>House Bill No.</u>	<u>Factor Loadings</u>		<u><math>h^2</math></u>
	<u>ELECT 1<sup>a</sup>.</u>	<u>ELECT 2<sup>b</sup>.</u>	
HB 155	-0.5133	0.3360	0.272
HB 165a	-0.4764	0.9699	0.941
HB 165b	0.4931	-0.8992	0.811
HB 257	0.6174	-0.2138	0.393
HB 268	0.6903	-0.3790	0.478
HB 538	0.2745	-0.1242	0.076
HB 559	0.8644	-0.5345	0.762
HB 570	0.8121	-0.4350	0.661

a. Expanding the Popular Control of Representation


b. Protection of Property Qualifications on the Franchise

The histogram of the legislators' scores on ELECT 1 is found in Figure 4.4. This distribution reveals two distinct groupings of the legislators. The grouping on the positive side of this factor tended to be more cohesive across the eight votes in that these legis-





FIGURE 4.4 ELECT 1  
POPULAR CONTROL OF REPRESENTATION






lators all scored closer together on ELECT 1. However, the negative grouping's distribution is relatively flat, indicating a diversity in the consistency among those legislators in regards to their opposition to the measures of this dimension. Overall, the division on this dimension finds 54% with positive scores and 46% with negative ones. In terms of the common variance that was retained in the two factors, ELECT 1 accounts for 78.8% of it.

ELECT 2, the other dimension, represents the protection of property qualifications on the franchise. This factor is virtually determined by one vote, HB 165a, which was a committee recommendation report of "do-not-pass." HB 165 sought to increase the size of the qualified electorate on certain state mill levies by deleting the requirement that a person must be a "freeholder" to qualify to vote. Thus, those legislators voting in favor of the committee report were taking an affirmative position toward the maintenance of a qualification on the franchise.

Figure 4.5 presents a histogram of legislators' scores on ELECT 2. This distribution plainly shows two opposing factions in its U-shaped, bi-modal pattern. The division is such that 70% of the legislators scored positively on this dimension. Of the 30% that stood in opposition to the "freeholder" qualification, 24% are in the extreme negative interval, while an overwhelming 57% majority is found in the extreme positive interval. The common variance accounted by ELECT 2 is 21.2%.



FIGURE 4.5 ELECT 2  
PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS ON LOCAL FRANCHISE





## Issues of the New Politics

Three groupings for the issues of the new politics were chosen: consumer protection, environmental protection, and new morality issues. Each of these issue areas was found to be compatible with the design of this study; and consequently, they are discussed alphabetically below.

I. Consumer Protection Issues. The politics of the consumer is relatively new to Montana politics. This is rather ironic when one considers that most of the U.S. Senators from the state have championed the "small man" and fought the strongholds of big business--especially Senator Metcalf, who is recognized by his colleagues as an expert on consumer interests involving public utilities. The real push behind consumer politics in the state came with the adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution. Within this fundamental law there is a provision for a consumer counsel office, which is charged with the duty of representing consumer interests in hearings before the Public Service Commission. Such a foundation provided the recognition that groups organizing consumer interests so badly needed within governmental circles.

The consumer protection issue area contains eleven votes on nine different House bills. The intercorrelation matrix formed across the eleven votes was then factor analyzed. Two principal components resulted from the analysis which satisfied the criteria for determining significance. Together, these two components accounted for 75.5% of the total variance. To clarify the interpretation of these dimensions, the axes representing the two components were rotated. Because the factor solution revealed two clusters of votes, the axes were rotated so as to pass through the





center of the clusterings. This required an oblique rotation, which altered the relationship between the axes so that they have a correlation of -0.66. For easy reference, the two dimensions have been labeled CONSUME 1 and CONSUME 2. Loadings and communalities of each of the votes, taken as variables, are listed in Table 4.4.

TABLE 4.4 Oblique-Rotated Structure Matrix for House Bills Composing the Consumer Protection Issue Area

<u>House Bill No.</u>	<u>Factor Loadings</u>		
	<u>CONSUME 1<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>CONSUME 2<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>h<sup>2</sup></u>
HB 29	0.6685	-0.8026	0.678
HB 54a	-0.9107	0.5676	0.831
HB 54b	0.8137	-0.6596	0.689
HB 73	0.6218	-0.7053	0.541
HB 121	0.8822	-0.5881	0.778
HB 147	0.7328	-0.6367	0.579
HB 276a	-0.6024	0.9894	0.983
HB 276b	0.6122	-0.9586	0.920
HB 290	-0.4294	0.6490	0.421
HB 523	0.8102	-0.5702	0.659
HJR 7	0.8584	-0.5038	0.744

a. Protection of Consumer Interests

b. Protection of Public Utility Interests

The first dimension, CONSUME 1, appears to represent a protective position toward consumer interests. The heaviest loading on CONSUME 1 is HB 54a, which was a vote on the substitute motion not to adopt a conference committee report on the bill. Because disparate amendments to the bill had been accepted in one chamber while refused in the other, a conference committee was struck between the state's House and Senate to reach an agreeable settlement on HB 54. The resulting settlement was



favored by the Democrats, who had dominated the conference committee since they controlled both chambers of the legislature. The ensuing vote on the conference committee report hence became a party division vote--all House members voted with their party with the exceptions of a Republican who switched to vote with the Democrats and another Republican who was absent. Another important vote to CONSUME 1 is the third reading on HB 121, which sought to minimize the rate of increases on utility rates. Two other significant third reading votes were on House Joint Resolution (HJR) 7 and HB 523. The former called for a Legislative Council investigation on the procedures and practices of regulating insurance companies, while the latter required insurance companies to issue automobile liability policies to applicants.

Figure 4.6 presents a histogram of the legislators' scores on CONSUME 1. The distribution is the familiar U-shaped, bi-modal pattern similar to that of LABOR. Those legislators with positive scores supported, at least marginally, consumer protection measures. The division between the positive and negative sides of the dimension is 58% and 42%, respectively. In terms of the common variance that was retained in the two factors, CONSUME 1 accounted for 85.9%.

The second dimension, CONSUME 2, represents, on the other hand, just the opposite interests of CONSUME 1. This dimension measures support for protecting public utility interests. The major vote on this dimension, HB 276a, is on a committee report motion that the bill "do not-pass," and it is this single vote which overwhelmingly determined the positions on this dimension. HB 276 disallowed public utilities to claim advertising expenses and contributions in the setting of the rates



FIGURE 4.6 CONSUME 1  
CONSUMER INTERESTS







FIGURE 4.7  
UTILITIES  
CONSUME 2







they charge. Thus, a legislator voting in favor of the committee report motion was taking a protective stand on public utility interests.

Figure 4.7 shows the histogram for the distribution of scores on CONSUME 2. This distribution is basically W-shaped. But the most interesting feature of this distribution is its extreme polar groupings of the legislators. The far two positive intervals contain 53% of the legislators, while the extreme negative interval has 32%. The overall division on the dimension is 56% positive and 44% negative. This dimension accounts for the remaining 14.9% of the common variance among the two factors.

II. Environmental Protection Issues. Conservation has long been a popular and successful movement in Montana largely because it never really challenged the industrial forces which were seen as the state's key to economic development. But recent environmentalists take a much firmer stand on governmental protection of the environment than the conservationists did in the past--either strictly regulate the depletion of the state's natural resources or face bleak prospects for future generations of Montana. Such a position was obviously ill received by the business community, but then the environmentalist did not pose a real threat to commercial interests. That is, until just recently when, as did the consumer protectionists, the environmentalists found support in the new Montana Constitution. An entire article in the 1972 Constitution is devoted to the environment and natural resources. Within this article, the legislature is charged with providing "adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and



degradation of natural resources" (Mont. Const. art 9, sec. 1).

Backed by the fundamental law of the state, the environmental protection movement has been received more credibly by government, but business interests did not waver in contesting that new found support. The rich coal deposits in eastern Montana are scheduled for extraction by the energy industry and environmentalists will have to do more than wave a new constitution if they hope to limit the fossil fuel exploitation.

In the environmental protection issue area, nineteen votes, on thirteen different bills, were gathered for analysis. The inter-correlation matrix formed across the nineteen votes was then factor analyzed. Three principal components resulted from the analysis. Taken together, these three components accounted for 64.2% of the total variance. The axes representing the three components were then rotated. Because the factor analysis revealed roughly three clusters of votes, the axes were rotated through the centers of these clusterings. This required an oblique rotation which changed the relationship between the axes so that the first dimension and the second dimension have a correlation of -0.66, the first and the third dimension have a correlation of -0.34, and the second and the third have a correlation of +0.43. The three dimensions have been named ENVIR 1, ENVIR 2, and ENVIR 3. Loadings and communalities of the individual votes on each of these three factors are given in Table 4.5.

The first dimension, ENVIR 1, represents positions taken in favor of strong regulation of coal development within the state. The four votes with the heaviest loadings on this factor all relate to varying




levels of regulation of coal extraction. The heaviest loading is a vote on a motion to reconsider the previous action taken on the second reading of HB 492. This bill called for a moratorium on all coal development until studies had evaluated the possible adverse effects such development might have on the health, safety and welfare of the State's people. HB 492 had survived a hostile "do-not-pass" committee report motion by one vote, but then went on to be defeated on second reading by a single vote. However, one final attempt to save the bill was made with the motion to reconsider. Those legislators voting for reconsideration were taking a favorable stand on ENVIR 1. Two of the remaining three important votes on this dimension are on HB 509, which altered the basis for determining and raising the strip mines license tax. HB 509c was a vote on an amendment which sought to raise the license tax to be the total amount of profit made on a ton of coal minus one cent. After this amendment's defeat, HB 509b became the compromise amendment which placed the license tax around 50% of the profit return on a ton of coal. Obviously, legislators favoring these amendments supported strong regulations on coal development. But the strictest regulation was proposed in HB 391, which called for a complete ban on strip mining. The vote on this bill was on a substitute motion that HB 391 "do pass." Support for this vote reflected the strongest sentiments against coal development.

Figure 4.8 presents a histogram on the distribution of scores on ENVIR 1. The shape of this distribution is relatively flat. This indicates a wide diversity among legislators in the consistency with which they supported or opposed the measures of this dimension. The division



FIGURE 4.8 ENVIR/1  
COAL DEVELOPMENT







between positive and negative scores on ENVIR 1 is extremely close: 51% and 49% respectively. In terms of the common variance that was retained in the three factors, ENVIR 1 accounts for 82% of it.

TABLE 4.5 Oblique-Rotated Structure Matrix for House Bills Composing the Environmental Protection Issue Area

House Bill No.	<u>Factor Loadings</u>			<u>h<sup>2</sup></u>
	<u>ENVIR 1<sup>a.</sup></u>	<u>ENVIR 2<sup>b.</sup></u>	<u>ENVIR 3<sup>c.</sup></u>	
HB 76	-0.6802	0.6303	0.2245	0.526
HB 133a	0.6331	-0.9409	-0.2744	0.908
HB 133b	0.5672	-0.8146	-0.2452	0.680
HB 133c	0.5778	-0.8584	-0.3677	0.737
HB 133d	-0.4497	0.7771	0.4807	0.640
HB 157	0.6484	-0.4180	-0.1109	0.434
HB 162	0.5826	-0.7628	-0.5797	0.665
HB 205	0.4917	-0.6432	-0.4170	0.443
HB 217	-0.2497	0.3960	0.5573	0.342
HB 237	0.5435	-0.4498	-0.4644	0.386
HB 341a	0.6931	-0.5890	-0.7467	0.778
HB 341b	-0.6148	0.6020	0.6325	0.599
HB 391	0.6815	-0.4451	-0.0354	0.510
HB 470	-0.5831	0.5567	0.6012	0.536
HB 492	0.8472	-0.7038	-0.4267	0.763
HB 506	-0.5968	0.4472	0.3338	0.377
HB 509a	0.6038	-0.4588	-0.3344	0.385
HB 509b	0.7803	-0.6037	-0.5445	0.699
HB 509c	0.7694	-0.4534	-0.2431	0.598

a. Regulation of Coal Development

b. Reaction Against the Wild Rivers Bill

c. Protection of Business and Land Development Interests

The second dimension, ENVIR 2, identifies an anti-environmental faction which emerged because of a specific threat to that faction's interests by an environmental bill. More specifically, the dimension measures reaction against HB 133, which sought the establishment of a statewide system of wild, scenic and recreational waterways. Included



in the bill was the designation of stretches of the Yellowstone River as "wild river," which would have prohibited the access and development of its shores at these points. This impinged upon the irrigation interests of farmers and ranchers in that region. Thus, a special agricultural faction supported by other business interests coalesced to oppose the bill. The heaviest loading on ENVIR 2 is a third reading vote on HB 133. Those voting against the bill, HB 133a, are the supporters of the interests of this dimension. The signs of the loadings on this factor for the remaining votes suggests a pro-business bias for ENVIR 2. For example, HB 162, the Montana Environmental Protection Act, has a negative loading, as do all three votes on HB 509, the strip mining license tax. This means that the legislators voting against those measures would score positively on ENVIR 2.

Figure 4.9 shows a histogram of ENVIR 2's distribution of scores. This distribution is U-shaped and bi-modal. It reveals more clearly two distinct groupings of the legislators than did ENVIR 1. The interesting feature about this distribution is that it is as divisive as ENVIR 1's. There are 52% of the legislators on the positive side of the dimension and 48% on the negative side. However, it differs from ENVIR 1's distribution in that it more clearly grouped the House into two opposing factions. ENVIR 2 accounts for 10.1% of the common variance retained in the three factors.

The third dimension, ENVIR 3, measures support for protecting business and land development interests. The major loading on this factor is HB 341a, an act which provided for the enforcement of subdivision rules. HB 341a was a vote on a substitute motion of "do-not-



FIGURE 4.9      ENVIR 2  
WILD RIVERS







FIGURE 4.10 ENVIR 3  
LAND DEVELOPMENT







pass" on an amendment favorable to land developers. Thus, legislators voting against HB 341a were actually supporters of the pro-business amendment. Another important negative loading on ENVIR 3 is the vote on HB 162, the Montana Environmental Protection Act. Those voting against this bill received positive scores on ENVIR 3. Also significant are the factor's anti-environmental loadings on HB 133a-d, HB 509a-c and HB 492, which further indicates its protective bias of business interests.

The distribution of scores for ENVIR 3 is shown in Figure 4.10. This distribution, roughly resembling a normal distribution, isolates two rather small factions which oppose each other on this dimension. The extreme positive interval contains 3% of the legislators, while the far two negative intervals also hold 3%. Furthermore, the division on this factor is such that 59% of the legislators are on the negative side of the dimension, and 41% are on the positive side. This is the only factor in the study where the majority of the legislators is on the negative side of the dimension. ENVIR 3 rounds out the common variance of the three factors by accounting for 7.9% of it.

III. The "New Morality" Issues. Changes in public attitudes toward what should be regarded as acceptable in terms of individual life-styles, social relations, and political conduct characterize the issues which fall within this category. For example, several issues emerged from the "women's liberation" movement of the early 1970's. These included demands for liberalized abortion laws, for greater support for family planning programs, for improved and more readily accessible child day-care facilities, and for somewhat sweeping



changes in the general status of women in the society and, in particular, in the economy. In all, topics such as these have a moralistic quality that pervades the differing sides to the matters at issue; and, inasmuch as public attitudes have changed, they indicate the development of a "new morality" both in politics and in the society at large. As such, they are issues that were salient across the nation. And, as the national debate of these topics lingered on, legislative proposals were introduced within the Montana House of Representatives which were relevant to the matters at issue in each case.

Twenty votes, having to do with thirteen separate bills, were classified as falling within the "new morality" issues area. The intercorrelation matrix formed across the twenty votes was then factor analyzed in the manner previously described. Three principal components emerged from the analysis which met the significance criteria. Taken together, these three components accounted for 60.8% of the total variance analyzed. The axes representing the three components were then rotated to clarify the interpretation of the underlying dimensions involved. It was found that, allowing for the possibility of an oblique structure, the three dimensions were essentially orthogonal to each other. The Varimax solution to the orthogonal rotation task provided the results reported below.

The three dimensions isolated have been labeled MORALS 1, MORALS 2, and MORALS 3. Loadings and communalities of the individual votes on each of the three factors are given in Table 4.6. Since the factor rotation was an orthogonal solution, there is no need to be concerned that the dimensional structure to the voting patterns detected



is intercorrelated. Thus, the main task is to interpret and describe each of the dimensions.

TABLE 4.6. Orthogonal-Factor Matrix for House Bills Composing the New Morality Issue Area

House Bill No.	Factor Loadings			$h^2$
	MORAL 1 <sup>a</sup> .	MORAL 2 <sup>b</sup> .	MORAL 3 <sup>c</sup> .	
HB 68	0.7492	0.2852	-0.0756	0.648
HB 120	-0.2779	-0.0527	-0.0012	0.080
HB 157	0.4929	0.1971	-0.1410	0.302
HB 202	-0.4579	-0.5421	0.2159	0.550
HB 320	0.3944	0.2829	-0.0883	0.243
HB 368	-0.6337	0.0357	0.0062	0.403
HB 372	0.6955	0.1959	-0.0369	0.523
HB 402	0.6455	0.0448	-0.0641	0.423
HB 411	-0.4275	-0.3338	0.2121	0.339
HB 463a	-0.1111	-0.0572	0.7953	0.648
HB 463b	0.0302	-0.1000	0.9581	0.929
HB 463c	0.2799	0.5202	-0.0282	0.350
HB 463d	-0.1441	-0.2358	0.7666	0.664
HB 463e	-0.0778	0.8361	-0.1166	0.719
HB 463f	-0.1879	0.8633	-0.1273	0.797
HB 473	0.7748	0.0618	0.0950	0.604
HB 502	0.6900	0.0503	-0.0924	0.487
HB 6a	-0.9055	0.0759	0.0582	0.829
HB 6b	0.9403	-0.0382	-0.0795	0.892
HB 6c	0.8611	-0.0478	-0.0894	0.752

a. liberal position on social and human rights issues

b. pro-liberalized abortion

c. anti-abortion

The first dimension, MORALS 1, appears to reflect a general liberal versus conservative division on matters of social and individual human rights. The set of votes that load most heavily on this dimension are three votes connected with House Joint Resolution 6, which called upon the U.S. Congress to cut off all funding of the Indochina conflict and



to re-direct those resources to support of a massive domestic public works program focused on social, environmental, and energy problems. The first vote listed from this set, HJR 6a, involved an unfriendly amendment to the resolution, which was defeated and, as such, loads negatively on this dimension. The second-listed vote was that on second reading of the resolution, and the third-listed one centered on acceptance of a favorable report out of committee. Both of the latter votes were majority decisions in the House in favor of the resolution.


However, there were other votes that also loaded heavily on this dimension. Among these were votes on proposed legislation that would provide for support of day-care centers (HB 68), protect the confidentiality of newsmen's sources (HB 402 and HB 411), ensure the privacy rights of students regarding their place of residence and their college records (HB 502), restore certain rights of convicted felons who had served their sentences (HB 473), and promote occupational opportunities for women (HB 372). Finally, there is a notable negative loading for a vote on a proposal (HB 368) to require applicants for liquor licenses to submit to fingerprinting.

The substantive interpretation to this factor is clearly given by the general emphasis on individual rights and on a proposal to re-direct public resources toward social needs. In terms of the common variance that was retained in the three factors, MORALS 1 accounts for 60.9% of that overall variance. A positive score on this dimension, like the positive loadings of the individual votes, represents a liberal voting position toward the issues concerned. Figure 4.11





FIGURE 4.11 MORALS 1  
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES





presents a histogram of the distribution of legislators' scores on this dimension. This distribution is clearly U-shaped and bi-modal. A near-majority of the House is located in the three most extreme positive intervals; while another 30% of the membership occupy the two most extreme negative intervals. A clear division of the House is exhibited by this dimension with 56% of the scores positive on the scale and with the remaining 44% negative.

In contrast to the breadth of the first dimension, both MORALS 2 and MORALS 3 appear to focus on one particular issue: the set of votes connected with writing a new state abortion law that would accomodate, at least partially, the liberalizing effects of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on the matter. An inspection of the nature of the six votes (HB 463a-f), taken with regard to that attempt, indicates that MORALS 2 distinguishes support for a clear-cut liberalization of the Montana abortion law, whereas MORALS 3 depicts the division resulting from attempts to produce a bill that would meet the Supreme Court position with the least amount of liberalization allowable. These two dimensions account for 25.1% and 14.0% of the common variance analyzed, respectively. An interesting feature of these two dimensions is the fact that they are orthogonal to each other, thereby indicating that support on one dimension does not necessarily correlate with one's position or score on the other dimension. This result was most probably the consequence of some of the proponents of a liberal bill, having lost that battle, then choosing to support the less acceptable version; whereas others of their contin-



FIGURE 4.12 MORALS 2  
PRO ABORTION







FIGURE 4.13 MORALS 3  
ANTI ABORTION







gent chose to oppose that alternative.

Figures 4.12 and 4.13 present the histograms of the distributions of legislators' scores on these two dimensions. The distribution for MORALS 2 is relatively flat, indicating a wide diversity among legislators in the consistency with which they supported a clearly liberalized abortion law. On the other hand, the familiar bi-modal distribution appears in the case of the MORALS 3 scores. Moreover, this bi-modal distribution seems to be made up of two sub-groups, each distributed in a roughly uni-modal fashion around some point between its respective extremes.

\* \* \*

### The Relations Between and Among Issue Area Dimensions

I. Within Traditional Issues. Three of the five dimensions correlate highly and positively with each other. These are AGRI 1, LABOR, and ELECT 1 (see Table 4.7). On the other hand, AGRI 2 and ELECT 2, while moderately and negatively correlated with the other three dimensions, are positively related to each other. But this correlation is only marginally moderate. Thus, the three dimensions which are highly intercorrelated obviously reflect mutual groupings of the legislators across these issues. However, the low correlation between AGRI 2 and ELECT 2 suggests only a small proportion of the legislators patterned alike on these two issues.



TABLE 4.7. The Intercorrelations Among the Traditional Issue Dimensions

	AGRI-1	AGRI-2	LABOR	ELECT-1	ELECT-2
AGRI-1	1.000	-0.751	0.903	0.854	-0.512
AGRI-2		1.000	-0.547	-0.518	0.262
LABOR			1.000	0.900	-0.601
ELECT-1				1.000	-0.545
ELECT-2					1.000

II. Within "New Politics" Issues. First of all, two of the eight dimensions do not correlate with the other six (see Table 4.8). These two are MORALS 2 and MORALS 3, which do not correlate with each other either because they were orthogonally related during the analysis. The six remaining are highly to moderately intercorrelated. The highest correlation is between CONSUME 1 and MORALS 1, with a correlation of 0.92. The lowest correlation within this set is between CONSUME 2 and ENVIR 3, with a correlation of 0.38. Of these six, they break down into two sets, which independently are positively correlated. CONSUME 1, ENVIR 1, and MORALS 1 are all highly and positively correlated. In the other set CONSUME 2, ENVIR 2, ENVIR 3 are all positively and moderately correlated. The first dimension within each of the "new politics" issue areas obviously involves the same patterning of the legislators.



TABLE 4.8. The Intercorrelations Among the Issue Dimensions of the "New Politics"

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) CONSUME-1	1.000	-0.675	0.794	-0.714	-0.707	0.918	-0.017	-0.031
(2) CONSUME-2		1.000	-0.786	0.685	0.377	-0.687	-0.199	0.130
(3) ENVIR-1			1.000	-0.718	-0.449	0.822	0.122	-0.172
(4) ENVIR-2				1.000	0.482	-0.784	-0.117	0.102
(5) ENVIR-3					1.000	-0.683	0.124	-0.000
(6) MORAL-1						1.000	0.000	0.000
(7) MORAL-2							1.000	0.000
(8) MORAL-3								1.000

### III. Between the Traditional and "New Politics" Issue Areas.

The two highly and positively correlated sets of dimensions from both the traditional and "new politics" issue areas are also highly and positively correlated (see Table 4.9). Thus, this suggests that voting consistency over these six issue dimensions, AGRI 1, LABOR, ELECT 1, CONSUME 1, ENVIR 1, and MORALS 1 are all determined by the same force. Also, the correlations between AGRI 2, ELECT 2, CONSUME 2, ENVIR 2, and ENVIR 3 are all positively and moderately interrelated. These issue dimensions also share a similar organizational structure, yet the mutual determinants of this set are not as strong as within the other set, as exhibited by the lower correlations among these dimensions.



TABLE 4.9. The Intercorrelations Between the Traditional and "New Politics" Issue Dimensions

	AGRI-1	AGRI-2	LABOR	ELECT-1	ELECT-2
CONSUME-1	0.905	-0.552	0.957	0.896	-0.581
CONSUME-2	-0.626	0.383	-0.710	-0.636	0.658
ENVIR-1	0.704	-0.352	0.800	0.766	-.0.652
ENVIR-2	-0.682	0.412	-0.753	-0.709	0.610
ENVIR-3	-0.703	0.441	-0.696	-0.682	0.277
MORAL-1	0.849	-0.526	0.938	0.871	- 0.606
MORAL-2	-0.010	-0.006	0.019	0.072	- 0.379
MORAL-3	0.030	-0.113	0.001	0.001	0.061

In summary, thirteen issue dimensions were isolated and described across the two broader categories of the traditional and "new politics" issue groupings. The intercorrelations among these dimensions further reveals three distinct clusterings of the thirteen dimensions. The first included high, positive correlations among AGRI 1, LABOR, ELECT 1, CONSUME 1, ENVIR 1, and MORALS 1. The second set, although not as highly intercorrelated as the first set, contained AGRI 2, ELECT 2, CONSUME 2, ENVIR 2, and ENVIR 3. The final set holds MORALS 2 and MORALS 3, which are neither correlated with the other dimensions nor between themselves.





## CHAPTER V

### DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING BEHAVIOR ON TRADITIONAL AND "NEW POLITICS" ISSUES

One of the underlying arguments made in Chapter II is that Montana's political cleavage structure is defined along the lines of economic regionalism. The political issue areas which have seemed to emerge from this factor are described in Chapter IV as traditional issues. Further, it is also noted in Chapter II that issues of a "new politics" have arisen within the state legislature. Representative of these issues are the dimensions described in Chapter IV as the "new politics" issues. Therefore, after having isolated, identified, and described the traditional and "new politics" issue dimensions found in the 1973 Montana House of Representatives, it is appropriate at this point to consider the sources of variation of voting behavior among House members on such issue dimensions. In this chapter three particular determinants of voting behavior in regards to the state's cleavage structure are examined: regionalism, political party, and specific constituency factors. Thus, the following discussion presents the final stage of the analysis on the data gathered in this study.

The actual findings of this analysis are described in a two-fold manner. First, all bivariate relationships between the issue dimensions and the independent variables, i.e. region, party, and select constituency characteristics, are discussed. In addition, the inter-correlations among the independent variables are outlined. Finally, the joint contributions of the independent variables, taken together, are reported in an effort to explain the variation in voting behavior on each



issue.

### Regionalism and Political Party

As it was argued earlier, Montana has experienced development in terms of three economic regions--the northeastern wheatlands, the southeastern rangelands, and the western mountains. The political culture, the economy, and the general societal evolution of these regions form the basis of the differing and competing interests found in the state's political cleavage structure. In this regard, regionalism, as used in this study, represents those traditional divisions.

Thus, in terms of the thirteen issue dimensions already described, one would anticipate regionalism to correlate more highly with the traditional issue dimensions than the "new politics" issue set. Table 5.1 lists the correlations between these dimensions and region.<sup>1</sup> And indeed, the eta coefficients in this table reveal that the highest correlation is with one of the traditional issue dimensions, AGRI 2 (Protection of the Commercial Feed Industry from Governmental Regulation). Three of the remaining four traditional issue dimensions also correlate at a moderate level with region; only ELECT 2 (Protection of Property Qualifications on the Franchise) clearly displays little impact from regionalism. On the other hand, the "new politics" issue dimensions also correlate moderately with region, the largest eta being MORALS 1's (Liberal Position on Social and Human Rights Issues) correlation of .42. Overall, the agriculture issue area exhibits the most consistent and high level of correlation with region. Both of this issue area's dimensions correlate at a level better than .40. This is not surprising. As mentioned in Chapter II, the agricultural diversity of Montana falls within the distinctive regional character of the state's landscape.



TABLE 5.1 The Impact of Region on House Members' Scores  
on the Issue Voting Scales.

(a) <u>"Traditional Issues" Scales.</u>	<u>Eta</u>	<u>Eta<sup>2</sup></u>
AGRI 1	0.42	0.176
AGRI 2	0.56	0.314
LABOR	0.38	0.144
ELECT 1	0.31	0.096
ELECT 2	0.15	0.023
(b) <u>"New Politics Issues" Scales.</u>	<u>Eta</u>	<u>Eta<sup>2</sup></u>
CONSUME 1	0.39	0.152
CONSUME 2	0.23	0.053
ENVIR 1	0.22	0.048
ENVIR 2	0.36	0.130
ENVIR 3	0.35	0.123
MORALS 1	0.42	0.176
MORALS 2	0.20	0.040
MORALS 3	0.21	0.044

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Concurrent with the evolution of regionalism in the state, was the shaping of Montana's political system. In particular, the state's political parties became the means by which the demands of regionalism were articulated and aggregated. As noted above, special interests have been championed by each party. For example, labor concerns are protected by the Democrats, while stockmen's interests have generally been defended by the Republican party. The division of interests between parties is often that of a specific regional split. In further reference to the above example, the concentration on labor interests falls in the western region, while ranching concerns are primarily found in the rangelands. The political party has thus become instrumental in the expression of the state's basic cleavages within legislative politics.

In terms of the relationship between party and the issue areas, one would expect party to be correlated with most of the issue dimensions primarily because the organization of the legislature is along the lines of the two competing parties. Such is the case as Table 5.2 clearly exhibits. Upon examining this table, five correlations stand out as particularly high: AGRI 1<sup>\*</sup>) (.92), CONSUME 1<sup>+</sup>) (.91), LABOR<sup>\*\*</sup>) (.88), ELECT 1<sup>++</sup>) (.85), and MORALS 1 (.81). Another high correlation, but not quite the magnitude of the five already listed, is that of ENVIR 1 (Regulation of Coal Development).

An interesting feature common to these six dimensions is that each one is the first dimension from each of the six issue areas. Other than LABOR, which is the sole dimension of that issue area, all of the other issue areas have more than a single dimension. As presented in Chapter IV,

- \* ) State Governmental Administration Policies for Agriculture
- + ) Protection of Consumer Interests
- \*\* ) Expanded Employee Benefits
- ++ ) Expanding the Popular Control of Representation





TABLE 5.2 The Impact of Party Affiliation on House Members' Scores  
on the Issue Voting Scales.

(a) <u>"Traditional Issues" Scales.</u>	<u>Eta</u>	<u>Eta<sup>2</sup></u>
AGRI 1	0.92	0.846
AGRI 2	0.57	0.325
LABOR	0.88	0.774
ELECT 1	0.85	0.723
ELECT 2	0.49	0.240
(b) <u>"New Politics Issues" Scales.</u>	<u>Eta</u>	<u>Eta<sup>2</sup></u>
CONSUME 1	0.91	0.828
CONSUME 2	0.59	0.348
ENVIR 1	0.70	0.490
ENVIR 2	0.61	0.372
ENVIR 3	0.66	0.436
MORALS 1	0.81	0.656
MORALS 2	0.09	0.008
MORALS 3	0.00	0.000

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
the first dimension in each issue area accounted for the largest proportion of the common variance that was retained among the factors of that issue area. Thus, these first dimensions are the most prominent factors in each of the issue areas. And, as indicated by the above correlations, such a paramount phenomenon obviously is political party. In other words, the voting patterns on the first dimensions of the six issue areas are primarily determined by political party affiliation.

This is further illustrated by Figures 5.1 to 5.13. As it is easily seen in Figure 5.1, AGRI 1 is clearly divided between Republicans on the negative side of the dimension and Democrats on the positive side. Such a sharp division is also shown for LABOR in Figure 5.3 and for CONSUME 1 in Figure 5.6. The figures for ELECT 1, ENVIR 1, and MORALS 1 also reveal the basic party split, but in addition, each of these show a small faction of the opposing party voting against the majority of its own party. Such party crossovers cause the correlations between party and ELECT 1, ENVIR 1, and MORALS 1 to be lower than the eta coefficients for AGRI 1, LABOR, and CONSUME 1.

The remaining seven dimensions reflect even more party crossovers. Thus, party alone can not explain the underlying patterning of the legislators for these seven: AGRI 2, ELECT 2, CONSUME 2 (Protection of Public Utility Interests), ENVIR 2, (Reaction Against the Wild Rivers Bill), ENVIR 3, (Protection of Business and Land Development Interests), MORALS 2 (Pro-liberalized Abortion), and MORALS 3 (Anti-abortion). Yet, even with these seven dimensions, party still has a respectable influence on AGRI 2, ELECT 2, CONSUME 2, ENVIR 2, and ENVIR 3. However, party



FIGURE 5.1 AGRI 1  
STATE AGRICULTURAL POLICIES



\*Note: This system of shading to indicate party affiliation is used throughout Figures 5.1 to 5.13



FIGURE 5.2      ACRI 2  
FEED INDUSTRY REGULATION








FIGURE 5.3      LABOR  
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS






FIGURE 5.4 ELECT 1  
POPULAR CONTROL OF REPRESENTATION.






FIGURE 5.5 ELECT 2  
PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS ON LOCAL FRANCHISE






FIGURE 5.6 CONSUME 1  
CONSUMER INTERESTS








FIGURE 5.7 CONSUME 2  
UTILITIES






FIGURE 5.8      ENVIR 1  
COAL DEVELOPMENT






FIGURE 5.9      ENVIR 2  
WILD RIVERS






FIGURE 5.10 ENVIR 3  
LAND DEVELOPMENT








FIGURE 5.11 MORALS 1  
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES






FIGURE 5.12 MORALS 2  
PRO ABORTION







FIGURE 5.13 MORALS 3  
ANTI ABORTION





has no impact on MORALS 2 and MORALS 3. As was noted in Chapter IV, the three factors in the new morality issue area were orthogonally related. Hence, MORALS 2 and MORALS 3 are not correlated with MORALS 1. Furthermore, since party is highly correlated with MORALS 1, the intercorrelations among the new morality dimensions, as shown in Table 4.8, negate the possibility that either MORALS 2 or MORALS 3 could also be correlated with party. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 show the extent to which the two parties are thoroughly mixed on MORALS 2 and MORALS 3, respectively.

The overall import of party, as expressed by the first dimensions of each of the issue areas, clearly signifies the extent to which divisions in these issue areas have been organized within the state's party system. The factor analyses reported in Chapter IV actually uncovered party as the major force in the patterning of the legislators in each area. But, minor factors were also produced, and party is a much weaker force in the secondary issue dimensions. Region, correlates moderately with the two issue dimensions which are not correlated with party, MORALS 2 and MORALS 3. Furthermore, region correlates impressively with AGRI 2, which has one of the lower correlations with party. Thus, it appears likely that party and region, together, may be important in explaining the patterning of legislators on some of the minor dimensions. However, before examining this, it is necessary to inspect the relationship between party and region.

Table 5.3 shows the crosstabulation of the political party affiliation of House members with the three economic regions of the state. It is clear from this breakdown that the two parties dominated different





TABLE 5.3 Party Composition of the House Membership,  
by Region Represented.  
(percentages)

<u>Party:</u>	<u>Region:</u>			<u>Sub-totals</u>
	<u>Wheatland</u>	<u>Rangeland</u>	<u>Western</u>	
Democratic Party	62.5	32.4	67.6	54.0
Republican Party	37.5	67.6	32.4	46.0
<u>Totals:</u>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<u>Cases (N):</u>	(32)	(34)	(34)	(100)



regions. The Democrats had significant majorities of the representatives from the wheatlands and western regions, while the Republicans had a strong lead in the number of House members from the rangeland region. As an indication of the strength of the relationship between political party and region, the selected measure of association, Cramer's V, yields a 0.314, which, at the least, is a moderate level of association.<sup>2</sup> What is important about this relationship, although it is not impressively high, is that party and region are to some extent correlated. This must be kept in mind since both variables are used as predictors. And as such, any effect that one of these two has on an issue dimension may involve a confounding effect by the other.

#### Constituency Characteristics

From 1970 U.S. census data on the general social and economic characteristics of Montana, ten constituency variables were selected as expressing some of the basic divisions within the state's cleavage structure. These variables were chosen to represent three sets of indicators. First, six constituency variables were picked to constitute a set of social indicators: the per cent born in Montana (CC 1); the per cent born in the north-eastern and north-central regions of the U.S. (CC 2); a ratio of the per cent born in the western region of the U.S. to the per cent born in the north-eastern and north-central regions of the U.S. (CC 3); the per cent of the population living in rural areas not places (CC 6); the per cent of persons with at least one year of university education (CC 7); and the per cent of foreign stock from Roman Catholic countries--Latin America, Italy, and Eastern Europe (CC 10). Two other variables were selected to represent economic indicators: a



## LIST 5.1 Descriptions of the Selected Constituency Characteristics.

<u>Symbol:</u>	<u>Descriptions:</u>
CC 1	Per cent of population born in Montana.
CC 2	Per cent of population born in the North-eastern or North-central regions of the United States.
CC 3	Ratio of per cent of population born in the Western region of the United States to that born in either the North-eastern or North-central regions of the nation.
CC 4	Ratio of the per cent of workers employed in agricultural industries to the per cent of workers employed in blue-collar industries.
CC 5	Per cent employed in professional, finance, insurance and real estate industries combined.
CC 6	Per cent of population living in rural areas that are not listed as "places", (i.e., those living in "open country".)
CC 7	Per cent of population reporting at least one year of university education.
CC 8	Ratio of per cent of homes having a value greater than \$25,000 to the per cent of population who report present residence as same as in 1965.
CC 9	Per cent of farm families with incomes less than \$8,000 annually.
CC 10	Per cent of foreign stock from countries that are predominantly Roman Catholic in religious composition: Latin America, Italy and Eastern Europe.



ratio of the per cent employed in agricultural industries to the per cent employed in blue collar industries (CC 4) and the per cent employed in professional, finance, insurance, and real estate careers (CC 5). The final two characteristics were chosen as indicators of a constituency's social welfare: a ratio of the per cent of houses which have values greater than \$25,000 to the per cent of persons living in the same house as in 1965 (CC 8) and the per cent of farm families with incomes less than \$8,000 (CC 9).

The correlations among the ten constituency indicators and the thirteen issue dimensions are listed in Table 5.4. From this table, it is quite apparent that the correlations are all rather low. In fact, the highest correlation is one of .46 between CC 10 and AGRI 2. On the whole, most of the correlations are within the interval of  $\pm .30$ . While these coefficients are moderate to say the least, the values within which they range are similar to that of most ecological indicators.

Table 5.5 lists the intercorrelations among the constituency characteristics. The main point to be emphasized from this table is the degree to which some of the constituency variables are highly correlated. This is important because in multivariate analyses one tries to avoid using independent variables which are highly intercorrelated. The constituency variables which are the most highly intercorrelated are CC 4, CC 5, CC 6, CC 7, and CC 8. In particular, CC 6 appears to be the focal variable about which the other four indicators are highly correlated. Two other isolated pairings which have extremely high correlations are between CC 2 and CC 3 and between CC 7 and CC 8.





TABLE 5.4 Correlations of House Members' Issue Voting Scale Scores with the Selected Constituency Characteristics.\*

## (a) "Traditional Issues" Scales.

	CC 1	CC 2	CC 3	CC 4	CC 5	CC 6	CC 7	CC 8	CC 9	CC 10
AGRI 1	0.077	-0.211	0.183	-0.197	0.006	-0.185	-0.072	-0.008	-0.308	-0.279
AGRI 2	-0.023	0.321	-0.260	0.272	-0.201	0.172	-0.072	-0.186	0.381	0.463
LABOR	0.090	-0.265	0.255	-0.201	0.046	-0.185	-0.019	0.011	-0.241	-0.237
ELECT 1	0.062	-0.194	0.181	-0.202	0.028	-0.224	-0.010	0.010	-0.240	-0.199
ELECT 2	0.165	0.161	-0.114	0.122	-0.250	0.298	-0.336	-0.315	0.152	-0.023

## (b) "New Politics Issues" Scales.

	CC 1	CC 2	CC 3	CC 4	CC 5	CC 6	CC 7	CC 8	CC 9	CC 10
CONSUME 1	0.061	-0.238	0.232	-0.158	-0.040	-0.147	-0.071	-0.044	-0.182	-0.256
CONSUME 2	0.115	0.320	-0.300	0.175	-0.166	0.167	-0.213	-0.237	0.118	0.115
ENVIR 1	-0.052	-0.113	0.135	-0.113	0.032	-0.105	0.119	0.129	-0.061	-0.107
ENVIR 2	0.102	0.283	-0.253	0.328	-0.049	0.215	-0.125	-0.178	0.325	0.160
ENVIR 3	-0.111	0.253	-0.247	0.233	0.039	0.212	0.152	0.134	0.267	0.168
MORALS 1	0.025	-0.320	0.308	-0.259	0.087	-0.225	0.081	0.114	-0.273	-0.246
MORALS 2	-0.348	0.015	-0.038	-0.031	0.246	-0.079	0.346	0.337	-0.061	-0.049
MORALS 3	0.256	-0.046	0.030	0.115	0.114	-0.157	0.038	-0.030	-0.081	-0.027

\*Note: The values reported in this table are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients.



TABLE 5.5 Correlations among the Selected Constituency Characteristics.\*

	CC 1	CC 2	CC 3	CC 4	CC 5	CC 6	CC 7	CC 8	CC 9	CC 10
CC 1	1.000	0.215	-0.176	0.441	-0.037	0.045	-0.345	-0.455	0.022	-0.232
CC 2		1.000	-0.950	0.505	-0.283	0.175	-0.282	-0.326	0.192	0.206
CC 3			1.000	-0.385	0.161	-0.003	0.187	0.227	-0.074	-0.240
CC 4				1.000	-0.397	0.580	-0.422	-0.564	0.434	-0.016
CC 5					1.000	-0.564	0.851	0.825	-0.271	-0.097
CC 6						1.000	-0.585	-0.491	0.496	-0.219
CC 7							1.000	0.935	-0.236	0.099
CC 8								1.000	-0.214	0.023
CC 9									1.000	0.144
CC 10										1.000

\*Note: The values reported in this half-matrix are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients.



TABLE 5.6 The Association of the Selected Constituency Characteristics with House Member's Party Affiliation and with Region.

(a) Association with House Member's Party Affiliation.

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Eta</u>	<u>Eta<sup>2</sup></u>
CC 1	0.12	0.014
CC 2	0.14	0.020
CC 3	0.14	0.020
CC 4	0.12	0.014
CC 5	0.10	0.010
CC 6	0.10	0.010
CC 7	0.17	0.029
CC 8	0.13	0.017
CC 9	0.18	0.032
CC 10	0.21	0.044

(b) Association with Region Represented.

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Eta</u>	<u>Eta<sup>2</sup></u>
CC 1	0.19	0.036
CC 2	0.59	0.348
CC 3	0.67	0.449
CC 4	0.33	0.109
CC 5	0.15	0.023
CC 6	0.21	0.044
CC 7	0.11	0.012
CC 8	0.02	0.000
CC 9	0.54	0.292
CC 10	0.72	0.518

---



Both of these pairings are linear complements of another variable, which explains why they are so highly correlated.

In regards to the other key independent variables in this study, i.e., party and region, Table 5.6 presents the eta coefficients between the constituency characteristics and the two variables. Party has low correlations with almost all of the constituency variables, the possible exception being the low to moderate correlation between party and CC 10. Region, however, has four rather high correlations with the constituency features. The highest are region with CC 10 and CC 3. The distribution of these constituency characteristics across the three regions are such that they are concentrated in pockets of one or two of the regions. To this extent, region acts to summarize the full impact of these constituency variables.

#### The Role of Party, Region and Constituency Characteristics in the Traditional Issue Areas

In the following multivariate analysis, each of the issue dimensions is examined by a selected set of independent variables. The equations which express which independent variables are included with each dependent variable are presented in Chart 5.1. The following discussion describes the equation for each of the traditional issue dimensions and presents the findings generated from testing these equations.

As explained in Chapter III, the assessment of the effects of the independent variables is determined according to which variables are "held constant" or "adjusted for" in each test and in which order the variables are entered into the test. Because party and region were assumed to be the strongest determinants of voting across all issues,





CHART 5.1 Subsets of Constituency Characteristics used, along with Party Affiliation and Region, as Predictors in Multivariate Analyses of House Members' Issue Voting Scale Scores.\*

(a) "Traditional Issues" Scales:

	<u>CC 1</u>	<u>CC 2</u>	<u>CC 3</u>	<u>CC 4</u>	<u>CC 5</u>	<u>CC 6</u>	<u>CC 7</u>	<u>CC 8</u>	<u>CC 9</u>	<u>CC 10</u>
AGRI 1		XX		XX					XX	XX
AGRI 2		XX		XX	XX			XX	XX	
LABOR		XX		XX		XX			XX	XX
ELECT 1		XX		XX		XX			XX	XX
ELECT 2						XX	XX	XX		

(b) "New Politics Issues" Scales:

	<u>CC 1</u>	<u>CC 2</u>	<u>CC 3</u>	<u>CC 4</u>	<u>CC 5</u>	<u>CC 6</u>	<u>CC 7</u>	<u>CC 8</u>	<u>CC 9</u>	<u>CC 10</u>
CONSUME 1			XX	XX					XX	XX
CONSUME 2			XX	XX			XX			
ENVIR 1			XX	XX						
ENVIR 2			XX	XX		XX			XX	
ENVIR 3			XX	XX		XX			XX	XX
MORALS 1			XX	XX		XX			XX	XX
MORALS 2	XX	XX					XX			
MORALS 3	XX	XX		XX						

\*Note: The Party Affiliation and Region variables are not listed as they occur in all equations.



the effects of these two variables (referenced as main effects) were assessed initially, while adjusting for the effects of each. Then, the effects of the constituency characteristics (referenced as the covariate effects) were assessed, while adjusting for the main effects and all other covariates. Finally, the effects of all interactions are estimated. This strategy was used for all issue dimensions.

1. Agricultural Issues. After speculating about which constituency characteristics would make sound predictors and having observed the bivariate relationships between the independent variables and AGRI 1, the following equation was derived:

$$\text{AGRI 1} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 2} + \text{CC 4} + \text{CC 9} + \text{CC 10} \quad (1)$$

Since AGRI 1 is highly correlated with party, this independent variable was expected to dominate the solution. Even so, four constituency characteristics, in addition to region, were thought to have some impact on this issue dimension. Because this dimension dealt with state agricultural policies, constituency variables were selected on the basis that they were thought to express competing interests within this issue. In particular, CC 4, which represents the proportion of agricultural workers compared to blue collar workers, was chosen because it isolates those legislative districts where agricultural employment is significant. Because the Family Farm Act is an important component of AGRI 1, CC 8 was selected as an indication of low income farms, which are at the mercy of corporate farming. The remaining two constituency variables, CC 2 and CC 10, were expected to express certain assumed orientations toward agriculture that would be encountered within the leg-



islative districts.

Table 5.7 shows the results of the partitioning of the sum of squares for this model. As a per cent of the total sum of squares explained, the main effects (party and region) account for 98.2% in the case of AGRI 1. Overall, the equation itself explains 88.5% of the total sum of squares. Obviously, this model is quite successful in explaining the voting behavior on this dimension. But, in particular, the main effects are overwhelmingly responsible for such a good fit.

In examining the breakdown of the main effects, Table 5.8 exhibits the contributions of the independent variables across three steps. First, the unadjusted effects, which show the proportion of variance attributable to each variable separately, reveal party as accounting for a large 84.6%, while region explains a smaller 17.6%. When the two variables are adjusted for each other, the proportionate increase in explained variation accounted for by party is 75.7%, whereas the same adjustment for region is 2.6%. The fact is that each variable's effect diminished as the adjustment was made for the other because party and region are related. Notice that region's effect dropped the most, which suggests that party enhanced region's initial relationship with AGRI 1. The third stage, which introduces the constituency variables, shows party's contribution unaffected by the covariates. However, region's effect decreases, while constituency effects end up accounting for 8.4% of the proportional reduction of unexplained variation. Region's decrease is attributable to the high correlations between it



TABLE 5.7 Partitioning of the Sums of Squares resulting from Analyses of Covariance applied to House Members' Scores on the "Traditional Issues" Scales.

(a) Partition of Total Sums of Squares into the Main Components of the Models. (Per cent)					
	TSSQ	Per Cent Explained	Per Cent Main Effects*	Per Cent Covariates*	Per Cent Two-way Interaction.*
AGRI 1	80.084	88.48	98.20	1.21	0.59
AGRI 2	72.234	55.30	87.20	11.89	0.91
LABOR	94.974	81.35	96.13	2.43	1.43
ELECT 1	86.776	75.31	96.11	3.18	0.71
ELECT 2	94.417	43.89	59.17	40.05	0.78

\*Note: Percentages in these columns are computed on base of total explained variance.

(b) Distribution of Main Effects Sums of Squares decomposed into Party and Region Effects.

	Total Main Effects SSQ:	Per Cent** due to Party:	Per Cent** due to Region:
AGRI 1	69.585	77.94	2.53
AGRI 2	34.829	31.15	29.35
LABOR	74.272	78.68	1.51
ELECT 1	62.806	83.33	0.29
ELECT 2	24.522	53.82	4.18

\*\*Note: Percentages in these columns are computed using Total Main Effects SSQ as base.





TABLE 5.8 Impact of Party Affiliation, Region, and Constituency Characteristics upon House Members' Scores on the "Traditional Issues" Scales, when adjusted for Joint Effects.

	Unadjusted Eta <sup>2</sup>		Adjusted for Joint Main Effect (beta <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>a</sup>		Adjusted for Joint Main Effects Interactions and Covariate Effects (beta <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>b</sup>		Squared Multiple Correlation
	Party	Region	Party	Region	Party	Region	
AGRI 1	0.846	0.176	0.757	0.026	0.757	0.010	0.880
AGRI 2	0.325	0.314	0.194	0.176	0.212	0.137	0.548
LABOR	0.774	0.144	0.706	0.014	0.689	0.101	0.802
ELECT 1	0.722	0.096	0.689	0.002	0.656	0.005	0.748
ELECT 2	0.240	0.022	0.260	0.020	0.348	0.012	0.436

a. The "main effects" are those for Party Affiliation and for Region.

b. The "covariates" are the Selected Constituency Characteristics.

c. The "partial beta's" for the CC's are calculated by the formula

$$r^2_{y3.12} = \frac{R^2_{y.123} - R^2_{y.12}}{1 - R^2_{y.12}}; \text{ where } R^2_{y.123} \text{ equals the Squared Multiple Correlation given,}$$

$$\text{and } R^2_{y.12} \text{ equals the Squared Multiple Correlation for each}$$

issue when Party Affiliation and Region are used as predictors.



and the four covariates. Thus, party's dominance in this issue dimension is established.

The equation for the second issue dimension in agriculture is:

$$\text{AGRI 2} + \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 2} + \text{CC 4} + \text{CC 5} + \text{CC 8} + \text{CC 9}$$

Two different constituency variables were included in this equation compared to the model for AGRI 1. First, CC 5, an indicator of the business community of a legislative district, was added because AGRI 2 is an issue dimension favorable to agri-business. And, CC 8 was included as an indication of the established rich properties in each constituency.

The total sum of squares (SS) explained by this equation is 55.3% (see Table 5.7). This is considerably less than AGRI 1's. Of the explained SS, main effect account for 87.2% of this and the covariates add another 11.9%. This model does not fit the data as well as AGRI 1's equation. The apparent reason for this is that party plays a much lesser role in structuring the votes on this dimension. The unadjusted step (see Table 5.8) reveals that party accounts for 32.5% of the variance, which is more than 50% less than what party accounted for in AGRI 1. Constituency characteristics, on the other hand, explain 31.4% of the variation, which doubles its effects as compared to AGRI 1. However, the adjustments for party and region disclose that the correlation between the two independent variables actually minimizes their effects. But with the introduction of the covariates, an interesting thing occurs. Party's partialled effect increases a little bit, which suggests that region slightly suppressed party's effect when controlling



for only the two of them. Furthermore, the covariates make a respectable increment in the amount of the remaining variance unaccounted for by party and region. This equation reveals that the independent variables account for only slightly over half of the variation on this dimension. In addition, party, region, and the constituency characteristics each played about an equally important role in determining the voting patterns on AGRI 2.

2. Labor Issues. The equation for LABOR is:

$$\text{LABOR} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC } 2 + \text{CC } 4 + \text{CC } 6 + \text{CC } 9 + \text{CC } 10$$

This model resembles AGRI 1's with the addition of CC 6. Since LABOR dealt with increasing employee benefits, the constituency characteristics which were thought to be relevant were those which tended to separate agriculture from blue collar workers. The set of variables from AGRI 1 do just this. Also, CC 6 was included to isolate constituencies which had few employed workers, but rather mostly farm operators.

This equation fits the data quite well as 81.4% of the total SS is explained. Of the total explained SS, the main effects account for a stupendous 96.13%. As with AGRI 1, party's influence is a major factor for the success of this equation. The unadjusted effects show party explaining 77.4% of the variation (see Table 5.8). Region, by itself, accounts for 14.4%. When adjusted for each other, party still accounts for 70.6% of the remaining variation unaccounted for by region, which decreases to 1.4%. Party undoubtedly enhanced region's initial impact on LABOR. Even with the introduction of the covariates, party holds fast with 68.9%. It is rather trivial to discuss anything other than party on



this issue dimension. The role of party is clearly the determinant factor in the voting patterns on LABOR.

3. State Representational and Electoral Issues. The set of variables chosen for the first issue dimension in this area was as follows:

$$\text{ELECT 1} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 2} + \text{CC 4} + \text{CC 6} + \text{CC 9} + \text{CC 10} \quad (4)$$

This is the exact equation for LABOR. The reason for the selection of these variables is closely related to the types of industry in the state. That is, blue collar industries are for the large part located in urban centers, while it goes without saying that agricultural industries are rural based. This is important to this issue dimension in the following terms. ELECT 1 represents increasing popular control government and this means placing more responsibility with an urban electorate. Thus, it was anticipated that an urban-rural division on this dimension would capture such conflicting interests.

Table 5.7 shows that ELECT 1 has 75.31% of the total SS explained by this equation. This is equivalent to the fits for AGRI 1 and LABOR. Of the explained SS, main effects account for an enormous 96.11% of this. As expected, party is the explanatory force in this regard (see Table 5.8). Party alone accounts for 72.2% of the variation in this dimension, whereas region explains only 9.6%. Adjusting for both of these variables still leaves party as the dominant main effect, while region all but vanishes. Surprising enough, even the introduction of the covariates fails to budge party's influential position. Thus, as it was with AGRI 1 and LABOR, legislators' scores on ELECT 1 are largely





determined by party.

The equation for ELECT 2 involved a different set of constituency characteristics:

$$\text{ELECT 2} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 6} + \text{CC 7} + \text{CC 8} \quad (5)$$

Since this issue dimension dealt with property qualifications on the franchise, constituency characteristics were sought which would reflect "freeholder" interests. CC 8 most clearly represents the established property holder. It was assumed also that the higher the education level of a legislative district, the more property owners there are likely to be. Hence, CC 7 was included in the equation. And, CC 6 was used again to express an urban-rural division. The rationale was that urban centers have many more propertyless people than rural areas.

The fit of this model to the data is not as good as the four above dimensions. Only 44% of the total SS is explained by equation 5. Interestingly enough, of this explained SS, main effects do not dominate as before. In this case, 59% of the variation is explained by main effects; but, a healthy 40% is also accounted for by the covariates (see Table 5.7). The moderate influence of the main effects is further exemplified by the unadjusted effect of party (see Table 5.8), which accounts for a modest 24% of the variation. Region is even weaker in that it only explains 2.2%. Adjusting for these two variables does not alter this picture. However, the introduction of the covariates shows some interesting changes. First, the constituency characteristics explain 24% of the remaining variation unaccounted for by party and region. This is the strongest influence the covariates have exhibited across the traditional issue dimensions. Second, party's influence



increases, which suggests that region had suppressed its true effect. Finally, region becomes even weaker.

To summarize, party's role dominated three of the traditional issue dimensions: AGRI 1, LABOR, and ELECT 1. This is not surprising, for the bivariate analyses hinted at the strength of party in regards to these three dimensions. And, undoubtedly because of such strength, these same three dimensions explained the largest proportions of their total SS. Region emerged influential only in the case of AGRI 2, which was an agri-business dimension. On this dimension the Democrats and Republicans in the rangeland region and most of the Republicans from the other two regions united in the interests of the commercial feed industry, while the opposition came from a few Republicans and most of the Democrats from the other two regions. The constituency characteristics are most impressive on ELECT 2. Here the choice of indicators was significant to the explanation of variation of legislators' scores on the issue.



The Role of Party, Region, and Constituency Characteristics in the "New Politics" Issue Areas

The bivariate analyses showed that party was quite influential in explaining variation on three of the "new politics" issue dimensions: CONSUME 1, ENVIR 1 and MORALS 1. On the other hand, the remaining five dimensions showed moderate to no influence by party. Thus, the following multivariate analyses attempt to further investigate the strength to which party does or does not dominate "new politics" issues. Hopefully, region and constituency characteristics will tighten the slack where party's dominance diminishes.

1. Consumer Protection Issues. The equation for CONSUME 1 is as follows:

$$\text{CONSUME 1} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 3} + \text{CC 4} + \text{CC 9} + \text{CC 10} \quad (6)$$

Because CONSUME 1 represented a protective position on consumer interests, constituency characteristics were chosen which were thought to distinguish consumer-conscious legislative districts. CC 3, CC 4, and CC 10 were picked because it was felt that they roughly contrasted the orientations which are involved in the consumer movement. CC 9 was selected because it represented the economic underprivileged, who should be quite consumer conscious.

Table 5.9 shows that 86% of the total SS was explained in equation six. However, a very interesting thing occurs in terms of accounting for the explained SS. The main effects explain an overwhelming 97.2% of the explained SS, while region's influence is less than one per cent. But, also important is the per cent explained by the two-way interaction effect, i.e., a joint effect arising from both party and region. This is



TABLE 5.9 Partitioning of the Sums of Squares resulting from Analyses of Covariance applied to House Members' Scores on the "New Politics Issues" Scales.

(a) Partition of Total Sums of Squares into the Main Components of the Models. (Per Cent)					
	ISSQ	Per Cent Explained	Per Cent Main Effects*	Per Cent Covariates*	Per Cent Two-way Interaction*
CONSUME 1	93.651	86.21	97.23	0.60	2.17
CONSUME 2	98.260	48.97	70.49	27.74	1.77
ENVIR 1	90.074	55.27	87.62	0.37	12.01
ENVIR 2	94.580	48.77	83.73	12.40	3.87
ENVIR 3	79.050	53.43	88.34	9.69	1.70
MORALS 1	94.950	76.58	90.51	5.62	3.87
MORALS 2	87.809	23.51	21.08	78.61	0.31
MORALS 3	94.114	13.43	32.32	38.97	28.71

\*Note: Percentages in these columns are computed using total explained variance as base.

(b) Distribution of Main Effects Sums of Squares decomposed into Party and Region Effects.			
	Total Main Effects SSQ:	Per Cent** due to Party:	Per Cent** due to Region:
CONSUME 1	78.501	82.28	1.42
CONSUME 2	33.919	84.48	0.74
ENVIR 1	43.616	89.80	0.04
ENVIR 2	38.625	68.01	8.02
ENVIR 3	37.316	74.27	8.55
MORALS 1	65.814	75.14	4.77
MORALS 2	4.351	15.21	83.80
MORALS 3	4.086	0.17	100.00

\*Note: Percentages in these columns are computed using Total Main Effects SSQ as base.





the first time that an interaction has emerged as significant, and as such, renders impossible the interpretation of the main effects. Thus, what should be noted in Table 5.10 in regards to CONSUME 1 is that party, unadjusted, explains 82.8% of the variation, while region accounts for 15.2%. The adjusted effects for factors, interactions, and covariates reveal party as still the most influential variable.

The equation for CONSUME 2 is:

$$\text{CONSUME 2} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 3} + \text{CC 4} + \text{CC 7} \quad (7)$$

CC 4 was selected for CONSUME 2 because the public utilities have an impact on blue collar jobs. It was thought that a labor-intense district would be more prone to support this dimension. The other two constituency characteristics were chosen because they were thought to have a particular orientation toward big business.

Table 5.9 shows that 49% of the total SS was explained by equation seven. Of this, the main effects accounted for 70%, while the covariate explained 27%. The unadjusted main effects, as shown in Table 5.10, note party as accounting for 35% of the variation in the dimension. Region explains 5% by itself. When adjusting for regions' effect, party drops slightly in its influence. However, after the covariates are introduced, party's influence increases. This suggests that region had suppressed party's true effect. Also important is the level of influence accounted for by the constituency characteristics. While CONSUME 1 was highly dominated by party and a party-region interaction, CONSUME 2, on the other hand, indicates that party and the constituency variables, together, are the determining forces in this issue.



TABLE 5.10 Impact of Party Affiliation, Region, and Constituency Characteristics upon House Members' Scores on the "New Politics Issues" Scales, when adjusted for Joint Effects.

	Unadjusted		Adjusted for Joint Main Effect (beta <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>a</sup>		Adjusted for Joint Main Effects Interactions and Covariate Effects <sup>b</sup> (beta <sup>2</sup> )		Squared Multiple Correlation
	Party	Region	Party	Region	Party	Region	
<u>d.</u> CONSUME 1	0.828	0.152	0.757	0.012	0.757	0.012	0.843
CONSUME 2	0.348	0.053	0.325	0.002	0.384	0.005	0.481
<u>d.</u> ENVIR 1	0.490	0.048	0.476	0.000	0.476	0.001	0.486
ENVIR 2	0.372	0.130	0.314	0.036	0.292	0.006	0.469
ENVIR 3	0.436	0.123	0.384	0.040	0.360	0.078	0.525
<u>d.</u> MORALS 1	0.656	0.176	0.578	0.036	0.533	0.029	0.736
MORALS 2	0.008	0.040	0.008	0.040	0.000	0.058	0.234
MORALS 3	0.000	0.044	0.000	0.044	0.002	0.032	0.096

a. The "main effects" are those for Party Affiliation and for Region.

b. The "covariates" are the Selected Constituency Characteristics.

c. The "partial Beta's" for the CC's are calculated by the formula:

$$r^2_{y3.12} = \frac{R^2_{y.123} - R^2_{y.12}}{1 - R^2_{y.12}}; \quad \text{where } R^2_{y.123} \text{ equals the Squared Multiple Correlation given,}$$

$$\text{and } R^2_{y.12} \text{ equals the Squared Multiple Correlation for each}$$

d. The interpretation of main effects in these cases are suspect because of the rather sizeable interaction effect components.



2. Environmental Protection Issues. The variables selected for ENVIR 1 were:

$$\text{ENVIR 1} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 3} + \text{CC 4} \quad (8)$$

Only two constituency characteristics seemed applicable to this issue dimension. CC 3 represents what was assumed as an orientation toward a natural environment or an industrialized environment. CC 4 was chosen because the environmental issue of ENVIR 1, which was over the strict regulation of coal development, obviously would effect jobs by such regulation.

Table 5.9 reveals that 55% of the total SS was explained by equation eight. Of the per cent of the explained SS, main effects accounted for 88%. However, a significant interaction effect between party and region also contributes 12%. Thus, ENVIR 1, like CONSUME 1, has a significant non-additive effect which has to be considered. Unadjusted, party explains 49% of the variation in the dimension. The interaction effect, however, prevents one from interpreting the adjusted effects in Table 5.10. Even so, the adjusted effects for factors, interactions, and covariates suggest that party is the dominant force. In particular, this shows the constituency variables as accounting for very little of the variation.

The set of variables selected for ENVIR 2 were:

$$\text{ENVIR 2} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 3} + \text{CC 4} + \text{CC 6} + \text{CC 9} \quad (9)$$

This equation is the same as for ENVIR 1 with the addition of CC 6 and CC 9. ENVIR 2 dealt with the reaction against a proposed statewide "wild rivers" system. This reaction was to a large extent from certain agricultural interests which feared that the legislation would threaten



their water-front access. Thus, CC 6 and CC 9 were introduced as agricultural indicators which might depict support for this dimension.

This equation accounted for 49% of the total SS (see Table 5.9). Of the total explained SS, the main effects accounted for 84%, while the covariates explained 12%. Table 5.10 shows that, unadjusted, party explains 37% of the variation in the dimension. Region, by itself, accounts for 13%. When adjusted for each other, party decreases slightly in influence, while region decreases to a point of having very little influence. When covariates are introduced, party and region continue to decline. Constituency characteristics, on the other hand, make a respectable showing of 10.3% of the remaining variation accounted for by party and region.

ENVIR 3 included the same independent variables as ENVIR 2 plus CC 10:

$$\text{ENVIR 3} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 3} + \text{CC 4} + \text{CC 6} + \text{CC 9} + \text{CC 10} \quad (10)$$

The total SS explained by this equation was 53% (see Table 5.9), which was slightly better than ENVIR 2's. Again, the main effects dominated by accounting for 88% of the total explained SS. Covariates explained an additional 10%. As shown in Table 5.10, party alone accounted for 44% of the variation in this dimension. Region explained 12%. When controlling for each other, both party and region decrease in influence. The adjusted effects of factors, interactions, and covariates reveal that party drops slightly to 36% from 38%, region gains a little from 4% to 8%. This suggests that party suppressed region's true effect. However, the impressive point is that constituency characteristics, just as with ENVIR 2, account for 10% of the remaining var-





iation unexplained by party and region.

3. New Morality Issues. The independent variables selected for MORALS 1 were:

$$\text{MORALS 1} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 3} + \text{CC 4} + \text{CC 6} + \text{CC 9} + \text{CC 10} \quad (11)$$

This is the identical equation to ENVIR 3. These constituency variables were selected because they involved characteristics which cut across the social, economic, and social-welfare indicators.

Table 5.9 shows that 76% of the total SS is explained by equation eleven. Again, the main effects preponderate the explained SS by accounting for 90% of it. However, once again, just as with CONSUME 1 and ENVIR 1, a significant interaction occurs between party and region. This leaves the interpretation of the adjustment for the main effects in Table 5.10 highly suspect. Even so, party, by itself, explains a high 66% of the variation in the dimension, while region accounts for 18%. The adjustment for factors, interactions, and covariates reveals party as accounting for 53% of the variation unexplained by region, the interaction term, and the covariates. The covariates do surprisingly well in explaining 14%. The interaction term, which makes this a non-additive solution, suggests that there is something unique about being both from a particular party and a particular region in regard to this issue.

MORALS 2 is characterized by the following independent variables:

$$\text{MORALS 2} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 1} + \text{CC 7} \quad (12)$$

Since this dimension represents the pro-liberalized abortion positions, CC 1 was chosen as an indicator of parochial views about a more cosmopolitan



issue. Furthermore, CC 7 was chosen because it was assumed that the higher educated constituencies would possibly reflect a more liberal position on this particular issue.

Table 5.9 reveals that equation twelve explains only 24% of the total SS. Even more surprising, the covariates account for 79% of the explained SS, while main effects explain only 21%. Table 5.10 shows that neither party nor region play an explanatory role in this issue dimension. Only covariates reflect any explanatory power by explaining 19.4% of the remaining variation unaccounted for by party and region. Overall, this equation fails to involve the necessary variables in explaining the patterns of voting on this issue.

Finally, MORALS 3 composed equation thirteen in the following manner:

$$\text{MORALS 3} = \text{Party} + \text{Region} + \text{CC 1} + \text{CC 4} \quad (13)$$

Since this was the anti-abortion dimension, CC 1, which symbolizes parochial views, was kept in the equation and CC 4 was added, which separates agricultural constituencies from blue collar districts.

This equation does the poorest job of accounting for the total SS. It only uncovers 13% of it. In addition, the explained SS is so small that it is rather evenly distributed across main effects, covariates, and the two-way interaction term. Table 5.10 shows that none of the independent variables account for anything worth reporting. In fact the multiple  $R^2$  is a meager .096. All together, this equation misses the boat as far as involving independent variables which can explain the voting patterns on this issue.



To summarize, the three first dimensions from each issue area reveal strong interaction terms between party and region. They also indicate party as being the dominant force in predicting voting patterns. With the exception of MORALS 3, which simply could not be explained by the suggested equation, the secondary dimensions reflect a modestly influential role played by the constituency characteristics. Region washes clean on the "new politics" issues, with the exception of its interaction with party.

In contrasting the traditional to the "new politics" issue domains, four interesting observations can be made. First, all the first dimensions of each issue area are overwhelmingly determined by party. However, and this is the second point, there is a distinction between the three traditional and three "new politics" dimensions. In the three "new politics" issues, a significant interaction term was depicted, which made the equations for these dimensions non-additive. What this suggests is that the occurrence of party and region -- as was indicated -- has a unique effect on the "new politics" dimensions. Furthermore, it hints at the likelihood that region crosscuts the "new politics" issues. Third, constituency characteristics have a modest impact on the secondary dimensions across the two broader issue domains. Fourth, region only performed well in AGRI 2. In fact, in most cases, when the constituency characteristics were introduced, region ended up being washed out.

Overall, party's dominance shown by the analysis, indicates the extent to which it cuts across regions and constituency characteristics. In highly divisive issue areas like labor or agriculture, it binds the



regions together. Region, on the other hand, seemed to act more to summarize constituency variables, and when constituency characteristics were introduced, region faded in significance. In regards to the abortion dimensions, MORALS 2 and MORALS 3, the obvious variable, religion, was not available for analysis. On the whole, party assimilated the issues of the "new politics" quite successfully.





## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

This concluding chapter will link the discussion of the beginning chapters with a review of the research findings that were reported in Chapters IV and V. A summary of these links will be followed by the main conclusion to be drawn from this study: that, within contemporary Montana state politics, the paramount influence on issue voting behavior of legislators is political parties. Finally, suggestions will be made for improving the research design for a more definitive study of the changing nature of the interest sectors and their effect on the political parties in Montana.

In Chapter II the reader was asked to accept a particular characterization of the cleavage structure composing Montana politics, based on an historical account. The state's politics were described as emanating from two predominant cleavages: one cleavage is between an extractive economy base on mining industries on the one hand and agriculture on the other, while the other cleavage is reflective of two different political cultures -- a moralistic and an individualistic one.<sup>1</sup> It was also noted in Chapter II that these two cleavages visibly capture the interest sectors of the state: organized labor, the industrial management-financial sector, ranching and farming. The electoral support of the state's two political parties has been rooted within this context. The Republicans have drawn from the industrial management-financial and ranching sectors, while the Democrats have relied on organized labor and farming interests.



Some major changes have come about in Montana's society during the 1960's and early 1970's. A marginal petroleum industry has made Billings the largest city in the state, and the economic "boom" resulting from the strip mining of coal promises to expand Billings' population even further. In contrast, Butte, the one-time mining capital of the West, suffers from a major loss of population as the copper industry continues to face bearish markets. This situation is accentuated by the efforts of the main producer, Anaconda, to re-locate its operations in Arizona. In 1920, Butte was the state's largest city, with a population close to 42,000. In 1970, there were slightly over 23,000 people in the city -- although still sufficient in number to make it the fourth largest city in the state. In short, there have been major shifts in the state's population, not only from a rural to an urban setting but also in the form of a regional redistribution. Changes in the state's economy reflect the replacement of Anaconda by the energy producing industries -- hydro-electric and fossil fuel -- as the "heavy" interests in state politics. At the same time, the state underwent a political rebirth with the passage of a new constitution. All of these recent events have appeared to give rise to a "new politics" in Montana, one which might be either related to the state's traditional bases of political cleavage or independent of them.

A major part of this research inquiry has been to show the extent to which the "new politics" was translated into issue dimensions dividing the voting in the state's lower legislative chamber, and to evaluate how these dimensions related to the traditional divisions found in Montana state politics. First, it was necessary to identify



evidence of the traditional lines of cleavage in some form of concrete political activity. Second, an effort was made to demonstrate similar expressions of division out of the "new politics" phenomena, thereby showing their existence also as part of the structuring of Montana politics. Third, an attempt was made to determine whether the lines of cleavage underlying the "new politics" issues were independent of, congruent with, or competitive to those resulting from the traditional politics of the state. It was felt that the lines of cleavage being investigated would be clearly reflected in the roll call voting behavior of state legislators, insofar as this behavior represented the nature of the coalitions formed along such lines of division in the public. Thus, an analysis was conducted of data available from the 1973 session of the Montana House of Representatives.

The findings of the roll call data analysis were reported in Chapter IV. These results confirmed the existence of issue dimensions for both a set of traditional issues and a set of "new politics" issues. In fact, each issue area, excepting only the Labor Relations issue area, proved multi-dimensional. The "new politics" issue areas were more multi-faceted than the traditional areas. Both the Environment Protection issues and the "New Morality" issues exhibited three dimensions according to the framework of the analysis, while two dimensions were the highest for any traditional issue area (both agricultural issues and State Representational & Electoral Practices had two dimensions). A more important finding than the level of complexity between the traditional and "new politics" issues was however, that the initial dimensions in each issue area across





traditional and "new politics" were highly and positively correlated. These initial dimensions also reflected the largest variance accounted for in each issue area. This finding reveals that the voting alignment on both traditional and "new politics" issues was shaped by a common, underlying determinant. The secondary issue dimensions between traditional and "new politics" showed weak to moderate intercorrelations, but higher and negative correlations with the initial dimensions. This suggests that the force which shaped the initial dimensions was reflected in the secondary dimensions, but it did so in a lesser fashion, an opposite direction, and a more split, diverse manner. However, the forces which shaped the secondary alignments were of divergent sources as was exhibited by their lower intercorrelations.

Once the lines of division were identified and represented in the form of issue dimensions, an analysis of the determinants of the voting behavior on these dimensions was performed and the results reported in Chapter V. The major finding was that political party functions as the paramount force in the shaping of coalition alignments on the initial dimension of each of the several issue areas, traditional and "new politics" alike. However, the secondary issue dimensions do not reflect a single, similar aligning force. For example, the second Agricultural issue dimension (AGRI 2, Feed Industry Regulation) was largely determined by the economic-geographic region from which a legislator came. This is the only issue dimension in which economic-geographic region plays an important explanatory role. In the case of the second dimension of the State Representational & Electoral Practices issue area (ELECT 2, Property Qualifications on the Local Franchise), constituency characteristics and political party independently and additively accounted for





the largest part of the variance explained. This case was the largest contribution by constituency characteristics across all dimensions. The extent to which party was an influence in both of these secondary issue dimensions shows why the two were more highly correlated with all initial dimensions than with each other.

In the "new politics" secondary issue dimensions, the analysis was most successful in accounting for variance in the second Consumer Protection dimension (CONSUME 2, Utilities) and in the two secondary Environmental Protection dimensions (ENVIR 2, Wild Rivers and ENVIR 3, Land Development). The second and third "New Morality" dimensions (MORALS 2 and 3, both concerned with abortion), on the other hand, were poorly explained largely because the most relevant independent variable, religion, was not available for analysis. However, a major finding among all secondary issue dimensions in the "new politics" issue areas was that political party and economic-geographic regions had an interaction effect, whereas in the traditional issue areas the effects of party and region were additive. This meant that for the voting divisions on CONSUME 2, ENVIR 2, ENVIR 3, MORALS 2, and MORALS 3 party and region exerted a joint effect in addition to whatever separate effects they displayed. This indicates the breakdown of party discipline according to its regional components. An example of this was cited earlier in the case of the Silver Bow Democrats, who periodically split off as a bloc from the rural and other urban Democrats.

It needs to be emphasized again that the interaction effects occurred in the "new politics" issue dimensions but not in the traditional issue areas. There are two possible explanations. First,



the voting alignments for the traditional issue areas have been solidified along party lines for so long that regional factors do not override the effects of party. Second, the forces of urbanization may be reflected in the divergent positions taken by party members. The "new politics" issues are largely urban issues. Consumer protection, environmental protection (most support comes from the professional classes who live in urban areas and belong to the Sierra Club, etc.) and new morality (the urban areas are where the battles are fought for a more tolerant society) all strained the balance between the urban and rural membership in each party. Thus, there was less party discipline on "new politics" than on traditional issues.

The findings, then, lead to the conclusion that party was the paramount force in shaping issue positions. The partisan alignments cut across both traditional and "new politics" issue areas. Yet, the forces which work to break down party discipline were in evidence with regard to the secondary issue dimensions. And for the "new politics" issue areas, this breakdown reflected the delicate balance of the coalition of interests in each party.

The balance of interests that underlie partisan coalitions on issues at the constituency level is often quite complex. There is evidence in this study that maintaining such a partisan balance within the legislature is in addition a delicate matter. The linkages among major interests, legislative parties, and issues were shown clearly in the analysis of this study. However, the linkage between the elected representative and his constituency may have been strengthened if more care had been taken in developing indicators for constituency



characteristics. This point leads to one suggestion about improving the research design employed above for any future analyses of this type. What should be done is a factor analysis of a wide selection of constituency characteristics that set out a multi-dimensional characterization of constituencies. Thus, separate composite indicators could be constructed to capture differences among constituencies in terms of social welfare, economic, and sociological dimensions. The high correlations among the constituency characteristics reported in Chapter V suggests that some underlying dimensions could be extracted. Moreover, factor analytic scales would also counteract some of the problems that arise from using a single-item indicator to represent a complex phenomenon.

Such further work may confirm what the present findings seem to indicate about the future of the two political parties in Montana. As was suggested from the above analysis, urbanization is becoming a far more important force in Montana politics. The question for the future will be whether or not the urban-rural balance in each party can be maintained; that is, will there emerge separate urban and rural parties? I do not believe this will happen. The discord between liberals and conservatives within rural Montana is too divisive to permit rural interests to unite against urban forces. The Democratic party exhibits a healthy rural-urban balance. For the most part, the rural interests in the Democratic party also have been liberal interests, and consequently have been quite compatible with urban interests. However, the future looks gloomy for the Republican party, especially since reapportionment has taken away the weighted edge of their rural interest sectors





and thus has decreased the number of the seats representing those sectors. In the past, the Republican party has benefited from the imbalance between urban and rural seat divisions. For it mostly has been the party of the small communities, building its legislative base electorally in towns with fewer than 10,000 people. As the larger urban centers attain their fair share of the seats, it will be at the expense of the smaller communities. Thus, it appears that the Republican party is going to have to accept a permanent role as the opposition party in the legislature (in contrast to the leading position it had during the 1950's and part of the 1960's). As an alternative, it may have to build a serious urban outlook -- an outlook which will necessitate having it look at public expenditures from a different philosophy.

On the other hand, while the Democratic party may emerge as the dominant, ruling party, this does not necessarily paint a liberal future for the state. In fact, that party will need to have its leaders concentrate great energies on becoming a policy-generating party, rather than the brokerage party it was during past periods of Republican rule in the state. The emergence of the "new politics" issues has given the Democrats the opportunity to move toward a system of one party dominant rule. Their success, however, will depend upon the party's ability to continue to accommodate the urban interests of the "new politics" while balancing those interests with the rural-traditional interests of the party.





## NOTES

### Chapter I

1

See Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1976).

2

See Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds., Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964).

3

See Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

4

For examples of works by Lijphart, Lorwin, Daalder, and K. McRae, see Kenneth McRae, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1974). For examples of Engelmann's writings, see Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, American Behavioral Scientist, 18, No. 1 (1974), pp. 97-110, and Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, "Partisan Stability and the Continuity of a Segmented Society" The Austrian Case", The American Journal of Sociology, 79, No. 4 (1974), pp. 948-966.

### Chapter II

1

Don Eustice, a former Montanan miner, Detroit Free Press, August 12, 1975, p. 1.

2

A letter received by Governor Samuel Stewart during the "Great Drought" from 1917 through 1919, as reported in K. Ross Toole, Twentieth Century Montana: A State of Extremes (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), pp. 71, 78. Hereafter cited as State of Extremes.

3

Most of this factual data was taken from Thomas Payne's article, "Montana: Politics Under the Copper Dome", in Michael P. Malone and Richard B. Roeder, eds., The Montana Past: An Anthology (Missoula, Montana: The University of Montana Press, 1969), pp. 298-332. Hereafter cited as Montana Past.

4

Toole, State of Extremes, pp. 14-15.



5

Payne, Montana Past, p. 301.

6

Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), especially chapter 4. Hereafter cited as American Federalism. Elazar's thesis is a variant of the Louis Hartz approach to the study of new societies. The Hartzian approach identified the ideological development of a country and the spin-offs of the different stages of that development to the country's colonies. Similarly, Elazar traced three value subcultures across the United States in terms of migration patterns. This is slightly an anti-Turnerian approach--Turner claimed that the environment of the American frontier shaped the behavior, politics, economy, and values of its settlers. Elazar does not deny the impact of a frontier environment, but he also does not address its potentialities.

7

Elazar, American Federalism, p. 96.

8

Ibid., see table 15, p. 118.

9

Ibid., p. 113.

10

Joseph Kinsey Howard, "Plow: The Dream of Jim Hill". in Montana Past, p. 230.

11

N. C. Abbott, "Montana: Political Enigma of the Northern Rockies", In Thomas C. Donnelly and Arthur N. Holcombe, eds., Rocky Mountain Politics (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1940), p. 200. Hereafter cited as Mountain Politics.

12

Elazar, American Federalism, p. 113.

13

It appears that had the territorial delegate been a Democrat, he would not have been in as favorable a position with a Republican federal administration to quash indictments against the lumber operations, which had been cutting timber indiscriminately on public lands. It turned out that such indictments were dropped after the Republican territorial delegate spoke with the new Republican Secretary of the Interior. An excellent account of this is found in K. Ross Toole, "The Genesis of the Clark-Daly Feud". Montana Past, pp. 169-180.



14

It has been reported that Daly spent over \$1,000,000, and Clark spent about \$400,000 in the battle for the capital city. Clinch, Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana (Missoula, Montana: University of Montana Press, 1970), p. 119. Hereafter cited as Urban Populism.

15

Ibid., pp. 159-160.

16

During 1889 and 1900 there was a handful of political parties represented in the state legislature: The Democrats, the Republicans, the Populists, the Silver Republicans, the Peoples Party, and the Labor Party.

17

A letter written by Senator Walsh to Mrs. Walsh, September 23, 1913, in the Gudger Collection, as reported by J. Leonard Bates, "Thomas J. Walsh: His 'Genius for Controversy'", Montana Magazine of History, 19, No. 4 (1969), p.8.

18

See K. Ross Toole, "When Big Money Came to Butte" The Migration of Eastern Capital to Montana", Montana Past, pp. 182-192.

19

Marcus Daly remained president of the corporation, but the Standard Oil connection was unmistakable. Standard Oil's William Rockefeller was Amalgamated Copper's secretary-treasurer; and Henry Rodgers ("the real power of Standard Oil"), William Rockefeller, and Albert Burrage all sat on Amalgamated's executive committee.

20

Toole, State of Extremes, p. 104.

21

Toole, Montana Past, p. 191.

22

Ibid., p. 309.

23

In 1957 the first step was taken to alter such a disparity by creating a Legislative Council. This bipartisan body, which has a staff, investigates legislative problems directed to it by the Assembly. Yet, its staff is too small in size even today to handle the massive job of information gathering. Some of the legislators are beginning to hire research assistants out of their own pocketbooks. The legislative committee system is especially in need of independent research staff.



24

For a full account, see Richard T. Ruetten, "Togetherness: A Look into Montana Journalism," Montana Past, pp. 287-297.

25

Clinch, Urban Populism, p.7:

26

Toole, State of Extremes, p. 236.

27

See D. MacMillan, "The Gilded Age and Montana's DHS Ranch," Montana Magazine of History, 20, No. 2 (1970), p. 54.

28

Ibid., p. 55.

29

Ibid., p. 57.

30

See Toole, State of Extremes, p. 26.

31

Ibid., p. 27.

32

Howard, Montana Past, p. 251.

33

Department of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, Montana: Resources and Opportunities Edition (Helena, Montana, 1928), p. 125.

34

Howard, Montana Past, p. 255.

35

Ibid., p. 256.

36

Ibid., p. 255.

37

Toole, State of Extremes, p. 86.

38

Ibid., p. 93.

39

Ibid.





40

Ibid., p. 78.

41

Ibid., p.80.

42

Clinch, Urban Populism, p. 17.

43

See Charles Vindex, "Radical Rule in Montana", Montana Magazine of History, 18, No. 1 (January, 1968), pp. 3-16.

44

Daniel Foley, "Four Firms Hold Keys to Montana," Billings Sunday Gazette, August 20, 1972, p.1.

45

Malcolm E. Jewell, The State Legislature: Politics and Practice (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 69-70.

46

Payne, Montana Past, p. 301.

47

A Senate bill passed in 1969 had authorized broadening the amendment process in the elections of 1972, 1974, and 1976 for the purpose of consideration of amendments relating to the reorganization of the executive branch of the state.

48

The Montana Citizens Committee on the State Legislature, the Montana Citizens for Court Improvement, the Judicial Reform Committee of the Montana Bar Association, and the League of Women Voters of Montana each conducted independent and specific studies which led to a list of recommendations for constitutional revision.

49

"Classifying fewer than one-half of the document's 262 sections adequate for present needs, the Council stated: 'Provisions which invite subterfuge . . . provisions which are archaic, provisions which are ambiguous, provisions which are statutory, and provisions which place serious limitations on state government were found throughout the Montana Constitution.'" Montana Legislative Council, The Montana Constitution (October, 1968), p. 92." See Margery H. Brown, "Metamorphosis and Revision: A Sketch of Constitution Writing in Montana", Montana Magazine of History, 20, No. 4 (1970), p. 4n.



50

"New politics" is the label used to identify the style and ideas associated with George McGovern's 1972 candidacy for President. In particular, new politics "can be defined as a variety of populism that has expressed a widespread demand to make the American political system more responsive to certain popular concerns about 'real issues.'" Frank Kendrick, et.al., Strategies for Political Participation (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1974), pp. 169-170. In a loose sense, new politics is issue-intensive rather than the politics of personality projection, and it is reform oriented rather than protective of the status quo.

51

Leo Graybill, "The New Montana Constitution", State Government, 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1973), p. 92.

52

The Democrats had a 58 to 36 numerical edge over the Republicans.

53

See Daniel J. Foley, "Party Differences Show at Con Con", The Billings Gazette, February 28, 1972, pp. 1-2. The reform measures were votes favoring open legislative meetings, three day notices of legislative hearings, reapportionment by a citizens commission, establishment of a people's advocate, poll booth registration, annual legislative sessions, a "short ballot" of elected state officials, and no age limitations on state offices.

54

The new constitution was adopted on June 6, 1972 by a vote of 116,415 to 113,883. The election was contested before the Montana Supreme Court which upheld the new constitution, and that case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which refused to hear the case and thus, in effect, sustained the Montana Supreme Court ruling.

### Chapter III

1

See Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1973), 2nd ed., esp. chaps 18 and 22.

2

Ibid., p. 380.

3

There were five exceptions where legislative districts were not concomitant with county lines. These were legislative district numbers one, four, eight, nine and nineteen. After estimating the actual



number of cases involved in the overlap between districts, full counties were given to one or the other districts in question. District Eight received all of the data for Yellowstone County. District Eighteen was computed on the basis of all the data for Missoula County. Valley County was assigned to District Four. Carter County was given to District Two, and Sweetgrass County was added to District Seven.

4

"Zero-order" correlations mean that no controls, that is, orderings, for the influence of other variables are made. See Norman H. Nie, et. al., SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), 2nd ed., p. 280. Hereafter cited as SPSS.

5

See Stephen C. Johnson, "Hierarchical Clustering Schemes," Psychometrika, 1967, 32, pp. 241-254. The Computer program from which the hierarchical cluster analysis was performed is from the OSIRIS package.

6

See Nie, SPSS, pp. 479-482.

7

All initial-factor solutions are orthogonally related. Ibid., p. 477.

8

The program applied is described in Nie, SPSS, pp. 398-433.

9

Ibid., p. 405-408.

10

Ibid., p. 409-410.

## Chapter IV

1

See pages 45 - 46 in Chapter III for a description of the factor analysis applied in this study.

2

See pages 43 - 46 in Chapter III for a description of the criteria used in selecting issue dimensions.

3

See pages 11 - 14 in Chapter II for a discussion of the individualistic and moralistic political subcultures. See also Elazar, American Federalism, esp. chapter 4.



## Chapter V

<sup>1</sup>

The " $\eta^2$ " value between the independent variable and each issue dimension indicates the proportion of the total variance of the dependent variable which can be assigned to the "between groups" (in this instance, the between regions) contrast of means in the partitioning of the overall variance. It can be taken as an indication of the amount of variability in the dependent variable that is "explained" by the factor underlying the group classification system used as an independent or predictor variable. In that sense, it is roughly analogous to the " $r^2$ " and multiple " $R^2$ " coefficients used in regression and correlation techniques. See Nie, SPSS, p. 230.

<sup>2</sup>

For an explanation of Cramer's V, see Nie, SPSS, pp. 224-225.

## Chapter VI

<sup>1</sup>

See pages 11 - 14 in Chapter II for a discussion of the individualistic and moralistic political subcultures. See also Elazar, American Federalism, esp. chapter 4.





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# APPENDIX I

## LISTING OF MAJOR LEGISLATION COVERED IN THIS STUDY

Issue Area	House Bill No.	The Procedural Call Under Which the Vote was Taken*	The Vote Tally		
			Yes	No	Abs
<u>Agriculture</u>					
	72	Amd	41	48	11
	96	3rd	56	26	18
	108	3rd	62	28	10
	132	3rd	65	29	6
	180	3rd	51	41	8
	241	3rd	50	47	3
	468a	Amd	31	58	11
	468b	Amd	41	43	16
	468c	Amd	33	44	23
<u>State Representational and Electoral Practices</u>					
	155	C. Rpt.	54	40	6
	165a	C. Rpt.	70	27	3
	165b	2nd	31	67	2
	257	3rd	70	25	5
	268	3rd	63	30	7
	538	3rd	51	44	5
	559	3rd	53	44	3
	570	C. Rpt.	66	27	7
<u>Labor Relations</u>					
	44	3rd	65	27	8
	158	3rd	51	42	7
	176	3rd	51	42	7
	214	2nd	59	37	4
	253	2nd	57	33	10
	264	C. Rpt.	46	53	1
	294	3rd	63	33	4
	357	3rd	65	32	3
	372	3rd	61	33	6





Issue Area	House Bill No.	The Procedural Call Under Which the Vote was Taken*	The Vote Tally		
			Yes	No	Abs
<u>Labor Relations, continued</u>					
	445	3rd	68	28	4
	488	3rd	50	45	5
<u>Consumer Protection</u>					
	29	Amd	34	53	13
	54a	C. Rpt.	44	55	1
	54b	Amd	58	38	4
	73	Recd	42	47	11
	121	3rd	64	32	4
	147	3rd	58	40	2
	276a	C. Rpt.	56	34	10
	276b	3rd	35	55	10
	290	C. Rpt.	64	27	9
	523	3rd	56	41	3
	7**	3rd	61	33	6
<u>Environmental Protection</u>					
	76	C. Rpt.	61	33	6
	133a	3rd	47	52	1
	133b	Recd	56	44	0
	133c	3rd	42	54	4
	133d	C. Rpt.	36	57	7
	157	3rd	43	56	1
	162	3rd	61	35	4
	205	2nd	57	26	17
	217	3rd	61	28	11
	237	3rd	62	31	7
	341a	Amd	62	31	7
	341b	C. Rpt.	27	62	11
	391	C. Rpt.	29	55	16

\*\* House Joint Resolution



Issue Area	House Bill No.	The Procedural Call Under Which the Vote was Taken*	The Vote Tally		
			Yes	No	Abs

### Environmental Protection, continued

410	Amd	30	51	19
492	Recd	52	47	1
506	Amd	38	47	15
509a	Amd	47	39	14
509b	Amd	49	40	11
509c	Amd	38	55	7

### New Morality

68	3rd	51	31	18
120	C. Rpt.	71	25	4
157	3rd	43	56	1
202	C. Rpt.	56	36	8
320	Amd	38	45	17
368	3rd	48	45	7
372	3rd	61	33	6
402	3rd	62	33	5
411	C. Rpt.	65	7	28
463a	3rd	56	40	4
463b	2nd	54	36	10
463c	2nd	50	40	10
463d	Amd	51	41	8
463e	Amd	50	37	13
463f	Amd	50	35	15
473	3rd	55	40	5
502	3rd	65	29	6
6a**	Amd	37	49	14
6b**	2nd	53	40	7
6c**	C. Rpt.	56	37	7

\* 2nd = 2nd reading

3rd = 3rd reading

Amd = Amendment

C. Rpt. = Committee report motion on substitute motion to the committee report.

Recd = Reconsideration

\*\* House Joint Resolution











**B30154**